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ABSTRACT. This Note proposes using outlawry proceedings to bring legitimacy to the
government's targeted killing regime. Far from clearly contrary to the letter and spirit of
American due process, outlawry endured for centuries at English common law and was used to
sanction lethal force against fugitive felons in the United States until as recently as 1975. Because
it was the outlaw's refusal to submit to the legal process that warranted the use of lethal force
against him, the choice of process was necessarily preserved through basic protections such as
charges and notice. This Note argues that these principles can be updated for the twenty-first
century and used to subject the government's targeted killing of U.S. citizens to limited judicial
review.
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TARGETING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY OUTLAW
INTRODUCTION
[/T]hat outlawry is to be put aside as obsolete, and for that reason never to be
enforced in any case, however grave, is a proposition which at least would
seem to require further consideration. Future generations may unhappily have
to face more troubled times, and 'treason' may again be found in the indices of
our text-books. Is it well to throw away a weapon which has been proved of
service and which may be the only weapon available?
- Sir Henry Erle Richards (1902)'
On September 30, 2011, when drones fired Hellfire missiles at his convoy in
Yemen, Anwar al-Awlaki did not become the first American citizen to be
successfully targeted by his own government for execution without a trial. He
became the first citizen known to be so killed abroad as part of the CIA's covert
counterterrorism operations.
As a general matter, government-sanctioned execution without trial is not a
novel practice. Under the common law judgment of outlawry, a penalty "as old
as the law itself,"' a fugitive fleeing summons or indictment for a capital crime
such as treason could be killed instead of captured on the theory that
individuals unwilling to subject themselves to the judgment of the law could
not avail themselves of its protections. A number of authorities have incorrectly
asserted that outlawry, a legal weapon of critical importance for centuries in
England,' "has never been known on this side of the Atlantic."s In fact,
1. H. Erle Richards, Is Outlawiy Obsolete?, 18 LAw QREV. 297, 304 (1902).
2. See Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt & Robert F. Worth, Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing of
Awlaki in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/zoii/io/ol/world
/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-in-yemen.html. In contrast, Kamar Derwish, an
American citizen killed well before al-Awlaki in 2002 and the object of far less scrutiny, was
not a premeditated target. Erik Kain, The US Assassination of Anwar al-Awlaki and the
Blurring of Bright Lines, FORBES (Sept. 30, 2011, 12:31 PM), http://www.forbes.corn
/sites/erikkain/20nu/09/3o/the-us-assassination-of-anwar-al-awlaki-and-the-blurring-of
-bright-lines.
3. ARCHER M. WRIGHT, OUTLINES OF LEGAL HISTORY 214 (London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co.
1895).
4. See infra Part II.
S. Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Process of Outlawry in New York: A Study of the Selective Reception
ofEnglish Law, 23 CORNELL L.Q. 559, 566 (1937) (quoting Donald D. Holdoegel, Jurisdiction
over Partnerships, Nonpartnership Associations, and joint Debtors, 11 IOWA L. REV. 193, 197
(1926)). Howe focuses on the use of civil outlawry against absent joint debtors, but other
authorities have flatly denied the existence of outlawry in any form in the United States. See,
e.g., Harlow v. Carroll, 6 App. D.C. 128, 133 (D.C. Cit. 1895) ("There is no such thing as
727
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
outlawry was practiced in the American colonies and remained in force as a
criminal sanction in a number of states well after the ratification of the
Constitution. North Carolina put its outlawry statute into occasional use until
6
as late as 1975.
In the context of modern terrorism, however, the term "outlawry" has been
used loosely to refer to terrorist movements or state counterterrorism activities
that operate outside a cognizable legal regime or violate established legal
norms.7 On the rare occasion when outlawry has been invoked as a legal
sentence, it has been disparaged as the Western equivalent of the Islamic fatwa
and as the barbaric analogue to current targeted killing practices.8 In contrast,
this Note examines the historical use and legitimacy of outlawry as a court-
issued judgment. 9 My central argument is that the theory and past practice of
outlawry provide helpful principles for narrowly crafting due process
protections for prospective targets who are U.S. citizens.'o Properly
implemented, these protections would prevent their targeted killing from
legal outlawry in our American jurisprudence.").
6. See, e.g., Tom Tiede, North Carolina Still Employs 'Outlaw Law,' SARASOTAJ., Aug. 13, 1975,
at 7-A, http://news.google.conVnewspapers?nid=1798&dat=197So8l3&id=IxUfAAAAIBAJ&sjid
= TooEAAAAIBAJ&pg=6045,2420074.
7. See, e.g., Mary Bunch, Terror, Outlawry and the Experience of the Impossible, in
ENGAGING TERROR: A CRITICAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 112 (Jane Haig et al. eds.,
2009).
8. See infra Part I.
9. Professor Larry May has recognized the right not to be arbitrarily outlawed as one
of four major "legacy rights" enshrined in the Magna Carta in his work on these rights'
significance for modern international law and their potential usefulness in shaping
Guantanamo detention policies. See Larry May, Magna Carta, the Interstices ofProcedure, and
Guantdnamo, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 91, 95 (2009) [hereinafter May, Magna Carta]. But
Professor May uses the term "outlaw" primarily to refer to individuals such as refugees who
have "been forced outside of the protection of the law" and analogizes states' detention
policies to unlawful outlawry. LARRY MAY, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND DUE PROCESS 186 (2010)
[hereinafter MAY, GLOBAL JUSTICE]. This Note uses "outlaw" to refer to people whom
Professor May prefers to call "bandits," a category of individuals "who have voluntarily
chosen to be outside of the protection and obligation of the law." Id.
10. This Note focuses on reconciling targeted killing with basic constitutional rights but
recognizes that the lawfulness of the practice turns more broadly on the norms of
customary international law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the
provisions of widely ratified international treaties. See Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Addendum to Study on Targeted Killings, 15 28-33,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston), http://www
.extrajudicialexecutions.org/application/media/14%2oHRC%oTargeted%oKillings%20
Reporto/o20(A.HRC.1 4 .24 .Add6).pdf [hereinafter Alston Report]. The use of outlawry
against noncitizens raises issues that I touch on only briefly in this Note. See infra Section V.C.
728
122:724 2012
TARGETING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY OUTLAW
amounting to extrajudicial execution."
The extraordinary circumstances of Awlaki's killing could not more clearly
attest to the need for an extraordinary mechanism by which citizens accused of
terrorism can be guaranteed an opportunity to partake in the legal process. One
year and one month before the CIA-led drone attack on Awlaki and fellow
American-born radical Samir Khan," Awlaki's father sought unsuccessfully to
enjoin the government from killing his son." Nasser al-Aulaqi" claimed that
the rumored targeted killing program violated both his rights and his son's
rights under the Constitution and international law." In its opposing brief, the
Obama Administration refused to confirm or deny the existence of such a state-
sponsored program but nevertheless objected to the requested injunction as an
"unprecedented, improper, and extraordinarily dangerous" interference with
the President's military powers.
Judge Bates of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled
that the Executive's targeting determinations fall outside the courts' purview.
This had the practical effect of permitting the Executive to kill Awlaki without
judicial intervention, irrespective of whether the killing constituted a denial of
due process.
But the controversial decision also contained the intuition that informs this
Note. Judge Bates declined to grant Awlaki's father standing as Awlaki's next
friend, declaring that "no U.S. citizen may simultaneously avail himself of the
ii. Black's Law Dictionary defines extrajudicial action as action taken "outside the functioning of
the court system." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 665 (9 th ed. 2oog). Even when understood as
a form of executive action, the concept of outlawing terrorists has held intuitive appeal. Days
after 9/11, when asked by a reporter whether he wanted Osama bin Laden dead, President
Bush alluded to the "Wanted Dead or Alive" posters that littered the Western frontier. He
later stated, "It was a little bit of bravado, but it was also an understanding that in self-
defense of America, . . . 'Dead or Alive,' that it's legal." BoB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 100-
01 (2002).
12. Khan was not a premeditated target. Mazzetti et al., supra note 2.
13. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d i (D.D.C. 201o). The American Civil Liberties Union
and the Center for Constitutional Rights brought the case on Nasser al-Aulaqi's behalf.
14. This is the spelling of the petitioner's surname as it appeared in the case proceedings.
15. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 10-12.
16. Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support
of Defendants' Motion To Dismiss at 2-3, Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d i (No. 1o-cv-1469).
17. See, e.g., John C. Dehn & Kevin Jon Heller, Debate, Targeted Killing: The Case of Anwar
al-Aulaqi, 159 U. PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 175, 184 (2011), http://www.pennumbra.com
/debates/pdfs/Targeted Killing.pdf (Heller, Rebuttal) (describing as "profoundly
disingenuous" Judge Bates's assertion that deeming the President's individual targeting
determinations unreviewable by the courts did not amount to granting the President
unlimited power to kill).
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U.S. judicial system and evade U.S. law enforcement authorities."a Judge
Bates's reasoning suggests that even under modern precepts, a citizen's access
to the legal system and his rights under that system are-or should be-
predicated on his recognition of his obligations under that system.
The alternative would be to permit the alleged citizen-terrorist to exercise
his legal rights even while refusing to submit to the legal system that affords
those rights, turning the law into his shield while denying the government the
use of the law as a sword. It is perhaps an unwillingness to accept this
alternative, one that renders the government captive to its own legal process,
that informs the Obama Administration's targeted killing policy. That policy is
part of an aggressive counterterrorism agenda that has, by all media accounts,
"baffled liberal supporters and confounded conservative critics alike." 9
This Note shows that outlawry offers a narrow procedural avenue for
bringing targeted killing within the bounds of the law, by explaining the
conditions under which alleged citizen-terrorists place themselves outside the law.
The Note proceeds in five Parts. Part I provides an overview of the legal
void that outlawry proceedings can be tailored to fill. Due process demands
that targeted killings be subject to some measure of judicial scrutiny, but the
most commonly proposed models of judicial review suffer serious defects. Part
II traces the use of outlawry as a basis for executing untried fugitives
throughout history, and distinguishes arbitrary and extrajudicial forms of
outlawry from court-issued outlawry.
Part III presents a three-part case for outlawry-based targeted killings.
First, outlawry can be used to subject the Executive's targeting determinations
to judicial process without forcing the judiciary to make substantive national
security assessments outside of its proper role. Second, this schema corrects the
perverse effects of allowing the Executive to kill citizens with impunity while
its other counterterrorism activities, notably in the context of detainment and
surveillance, are subject to limited judicial scrutiny. Third, outlawry offers
coherent principles for legitimating and delimiting the government's targeting
powers.
Part IV addresses threshold issues that bear on the constitutionality of
present-day outlawry. Part V then draws upon the theoretical justifications and
iS. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 18.
ig. Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret 'Kill List' Proves a Test of Obama's Principles and Will, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/o 5/29/world/obamas-leadership-in
-war-on-al-qaeda.html; see also JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE
ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11, at X (2012) ("[Iln perhaps the most remarkable
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historical underpinnings of outlawry law to spell out necessary conditions for
the lawful outlawing of alleged citizen-terrorists. Part V concludes by
proposing additional restrictions on the government's use of outlawry, given
the demands of modem international law and key practical considerations.
Denial of a citizen's right to seek redress through the very legal system that
he eschews echoes the logic of outlawry law, which withdraws the law's
protections from those who refuse to submit to its obligations.2 o This Note
accepts that the exigencies of twenty-first century terrorism may require
authorizing the use of lethal force against citizens outside of a geographically
circumscribed arena of warfare, but also recognizes that the Constitution
demands that such targets be afforded a meaningful opportunity to submit to
the legal process. My project is to reconcile these premises, using outlawry
principles to construct a practicable alternative to executive carte blanche and
to existing proposals for limited judicial review of targeting decisions.
I. WHEREFORE OUTLAWRY?
This Part details this Note's most basic premise, a rejection of the Obama
Administration's position that it affords targets due process. It then describes
problems with existing proposals for judicial review. These proposals either fail
to protect the prospective target's right to engage in the legal process, or
advocate for what I argue is the wrong kind of judicial scrutiny, wherein the
judiciary is forced to measure the threat that the target allegedly poses to
national security.
A. Due Process Requires Judicial Process
The controversy over the legality of targeted killings has its roots in the
profound confusion over whether terrorism is properly treated as a crime or as
war," and whether the government's counterterrorism strategies are therefore
circumscribed by the rules of law enforcement or the laws of armed conflict."
20. A similar principle underlies the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, invoked by the courts to
bar the fugitive from suing for appeal while he is in flight. See Smith v. United States, 94
U.S. 97 (1876); see also Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 242 (1993)
(observing that the Supreme Court has upheld the doctrine "consistently and
unequivocally").
21. See GABRIELLA BLUM & PHILLIP HEYMANN, LAws, OUTLAWS AND TERRORISTS: LESSONS FROM
THE WAR ON TERRORISM 145 (2010) (describing targeted killing operations as a special
pressure point in the controversy over whether to treat terrorism as a crime or as war).
22. See David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions
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The realities of twenty-first century international terrorism do not fit into this
binary framework.2 ' This is well reflected in the facts of Awlaki's death, far
removed from any battlefield.
But rather than conceding that its current targeted killing policy denies
targets due process and justifying this denial on the grounds of wartime
exigency, the Obama Administration has chosen to redefine due process.4 In a
or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171, 174, 186 (2005) (observing that
the debate over the legitimacy of targeted killings reflects a more fundamental disagreement
as to the applicable legal regime, and proposing a "mixed" model that incorporates
elements of the law enforcement model under international human rights law (IHRL)
and the armed conflict model under international humanitarian law (IHL)). Nils Melzer
has laid out criteria for lawful targeted killing under the law enforcement paradigm and the
hostilities paradigm, respectively, but does not treat the distinction as fully reducible to the
difference between IHRL and IHL. See NiLs MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw (2008). The law enforcement/armed conflict binary has been used to argue for and
against the legitimacy of targeted killings. Compare Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing and
Drone Warfare: How We Came To Debate Whether There Is a 'Legal Geography of War,' HoovER
INsT. 4 (Apr. 2011), http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/FutureChallenges
Anderson.pdf (stating that the law enforcement paradigm properly applies, rendering
targeted killing unlawful), with Shane Reeves & Jeremy Marsh, Bin Laden and
Awlaki: Lawful Targets, HARV. INT'L REV. WEB PERSP. (Oct. 26, 2011, 4:23 PM),
http://hir.harvard.edu/bin-laden-and-awlaki-lawful-targets (arguing that lethal force may
be used against alleged terrorists, irrespective of their citizenship, under a conventional
understanding of the armed conflict paradigm).
23. See John Fabian Witt, The Legal Fog Between War and Peace, N.Y. TiIES, June
10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2oi2/o6/u/opinion/the-legal-fog-between-war-and-peace
.html ("[O]ur arguments about targeted killings are playing out at a historic juncture in
which the categories of war and peace, which the modern world thought it had carefully
separated, are collapsing into each other."). See generally Noah Feldman, Choices of Law,
Choices of War, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457, 457 (2002) (arguing that the four criteria that
underlie the "intuitive distinction" between crime and war demonstrate that international
terrorism can be characterized as either). But it is unclear whether the binary has ever
accurately reflected reality. Although it is always tempting to see the novelty in a
contemporary predicament, this Note is partial to the importance of also recognizing the
familiar. As early as 1943, Georg Schwarzenberger observed that thinkers have been aware of
the fundamental problems with the peace/war distinction since the emergence of
international law. Rejecting the assumption that peace is the norm and war an "event,"
Schwarzenberger argued, "[I]t is impossible to find an objective criterion which
distinguishes the status of war both from the status of peace and from the status mixtus."
Georg Schwarzenberger, Jus Pacis ac Belli? Prolegomena to a Sociology of International Law, 37
AM. J. INT'L L. 460, 466-68, 473 (1943). For a description of how this status mixtus affected
killing practices during the Civil War, see infra text accompanying notes 136-140.
24. The Administration's legal obfuscation threatens to create problems that extend beyond the
targeting context, and is best contrasted with Justice Thomas's dissent in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld. Despite opposing judicial protections for detainees, Justice Thomas steered clear
of muddling the definition of due process: "Undeniably, Hamdi has been deprived of a
senous interest, one actually protected by the Due Process Clause. Against this, however, is
732
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March 5, 2012, speech, Attorney General Eric Holder alluded to Judge Bates's
ruling in Al-Aulaqi v. Obama as clear support for the proposition that due
process "does not require judicial approval before the President may use force
abroad against a senior operational leader of a foreign terrorist organization ...
even if that individual happens to be a U.S. citizen."25 The Attorney General's
claim mischaracterized Judge Bates's decision and contradicted an array of
significant legal precedents.
To begin, Judge Bates did not rule on the due process implications of the
government's secret killing operations. Judge Bates dismissed the case for lack
of jurisdiction, and expressly recognized in doing so that his decision marked
the first time that an American court had, on political question grounds,
refused to hear a citizen's claim that government action abroad had violated his
constitutional rights."*
Moreover, despite recognizing the inherent difficulty of demarcating where
due process begins and ends, 7 the Supreme Court has insisted that courts play
a meaningful role in protecting the individual from arbitrary government
action, even in wartime. At minimum, this protection includes notice and an
the Government's overriding interest in protecting the Nation." Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507, 598
(2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
25. Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., Remarks at Northwestern University School of Law
(Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html.
Commentators have compiled a large body of legal and historical evidence dismantling the
Attorney General's interpretation of due process. This Section will only briefly summarize
the legal and historical arguments in favor of focusing on the practical considerations that
militate against a definition of due process that turns on a presumptive distinction between
innocents and combatants. These practical considerations play a crucial role in my
discussion of some of the requirements for legitimate twenty-first century outlawry
proceedings in Part V, infra.
26. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 49 (D.D.C. 2010) ("The significance of Anwar Al-
Aulaqi's U.S. citizenship is not lost on this Court. Indeed, it does not appear that any court
has ever-on political question doctrine grounds -refused to hear a U.S. citizen's claim that
his personal constitutional rights have been violated as a result of U.S. government action
taken abroad.").
27. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889) ("As we have said on more than one
occasion, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to give to the terms 'due process of law' a
definition which will embrace every permissible exertion of power affecting private rights
and exclude such as are forbidden.").
28. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Checks and Balances in Wartime: American, British and Israeli
Experiences, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1906, 1916 (2004). Schulhofer rejects the George W. Bush
Administration's attempt to establish that the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief
have traditionally been beyond judicial scrutiny, observing that
judicial decisions consistently reflected two judgments: that even under wartime
conditions, protection against the risk of unjust incarceration required the robust
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opportunity for a hearing before the individual is deprived of life, liberty, or
property.
The Court's affirmation of these principles in the detainment context has
served as a natural starting point for discussing judicial scrutiny of targeted
killings." In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,3 ' a plurality deferential to the Executive
nonetheless concluded: "Whatever power the United States Constitution
envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy
organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three
branches when individual liberties are at stake."" In upholding the habeas
rights of a noncitizen Guantanamo Bay detainee in Boumediene v. Bush,3 3 the
Court further stated that "[w]ithin the Constitution's separation-of-powers
structure, few exercises of judicial power are as legitimate or as necessary as the
responsibility to hear challenges to the authority of the Executive to imprison a
person."" Indeed, the only exercise of judicial power more legitimate or
necessary would seem to be the judiciary's responsibility to hear challenges to
the President's authority to kill a person.3 1
procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights; and that threats to national security,
even when convincing, could be less important than the dangers of overreaching
by a well-intentioned but overzealous executive branch.
Id.
29. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 3o6, 313 (1950) ("Many
controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but
there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty, or
property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to
the nature of the case.").
30. See, e.g., Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of
Terrorists, 31 CARDozo L. REV. 405 (2009) (extending Boumediene v. Bush to the targeted
killing context to argue for judicial review after an attack). The detention cases have also
been used to argue that due process does not clearly demand the trappings of a full court
proceeding when national security is at stake, see Holder, supra note 25, but this is not the
same as dismissing judicial process entirely.
31. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).
32. Id. at 536 (concluding that a citizen-detainee has a right to know the factual basis for his
detention and to receive a fair hearing before a neutral decisionmaker); see also id. at 596-97
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (observing that "the plurality's due process would seem to require
notice and opportunity to respond" before the government bombed a target).
33- 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
34. Id. at 797.
3s. See Note, Due Process Rights and the Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: The
Unconstitutional Scope of Executive Killing Power, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1353, 1369-70
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Although Attorney General Eric Holder suggested that the President's
targeted killing policy satisfies the separation of powers because the President
would "regularly inform[]" Congress of his use of lethal force,"6 legislative
oversight is not sufficient to fulfill constitutional due process guarantees." As
Alexander Hamilton declared in a 1787 speech to the New York Assembly, "The
words 'due process' have a precise technical import, and are only applicable to
the process and proceedings of the courts of justice; they can never be referred
to an act of legislature."'" Additional authority from the preconstitutional and
Founding eras supports the position that the phrase "due process of law" at the
time of the Fifth Amendment's ratification referred specifically to judicial
procedures. 9
Yet the government characterizes the extrajudicial targeting of alleged
terrorists as a well-supported modern practice. The Obama Administration
claims that lethal force is no more categorically prohibited against a twenty-
first century American terrorist, allegedly responsible for the mass murder of
civilians, than it was against Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, mastermind of the
Pearl Harbor attack in World War II.40 But this claim cannot survive on the
delusion that identical risks and rules govern the execution of these two
targets - the naval commander of a country that has formally declared war on
the United States, and a citizen whose crimes the American government will
not detail and whose death warrant the government will not admit it has
36. See Holder, supra note 25.
37. See Nathan Freed Wessler, In Targeted Killing Speech, Holder Mischaracterizes Debate over
Judicial Review, ACLU (Mar. 5, 2012, 7:34 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national
-security/targered-killing-speech-holder-mischaracterizes-debate-over-judicial-review
(arguing that our system of checks and balances demands that the courts play some role in
deciding whether the government's decision to kill its own citizens is constitutional).
38. Alexander Hamilton, Remarks on an Act for Regulating Elections, New York Assembly
(Feb. 6, 1787), in 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 34,35 (Harold C. Syrett ed.,
1962).
39. For example, in several early state statutes -including a 1785 Virginia statute of frauds, a
1797 Massachusetts statute on escheat, and a 1797 Vermont statute on prison discipline - the
phrase "due process of law" appears to have functioned as shorthand for judicial
proceedings. Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE
L.J. 408, 443-44 (2010). Similarly, several federal treaties and statutes adopted shortly after
the ratification of the Constitution guaranteed "due process and trial," again indicating a
judicial definition ofdue process. See id. at 444-45 & n.148 (emphasis added).
40. See, e.g., Jeh Charles Johnson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Def., Dean's Lecture at Yale Law
School: National Security Law, Lawyers, and Lawyering in the Obama Administration (Feb.
22, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2ol2/02/jeh-johnson-speech
-at-yale-law-school).
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signed.4'
In a February 22, 2012, speech, Pentagon General Counsel Jeh Johnson
ignored the risks and rules altogether, when he announced that "in the conflict
against an unconventional enemy such as al Qaeda, we must consistently apply
conventional legal principles."42  Specifically, he ignored the fact that
unconventional enemies such as Awlaki are not clearly legitimate targets of
lethal force under conventional legal principles. Traditionally, legitimate
targets are uniformed and participate in hostilities on a defined battlefield. The
killing of alleged militants like Awlaki, in contrast, makes for a number of
complications, including possible error in identifying the target." For example,
in 2004, the CIA detained German citizen Khaled el-Masri for months in
Afghanistan before conceding that it had seized the wrong man."4 The error
points to plain practical problems with arguing the sufficiency of rigorous
internal executive review.
Professors Richard Murphy and Afsheen Radsan sum up the problem
simply: "In the real world, intelligence is sometimes faulty. Mistakes occur,
and peaceful civilians are at risk. The law's method for preventing the
government from harming people based on mistaken facts is to insist on
reasonable or 'due' process."'I
B. Proposed Models ofJudicial Review
Accepting that due process requires judicial process necessarily opens the
door to subjecting the government's targeting determinations to varying
degrees of judicial scrutiny. With an eye on the fallibility of government
intelligence, this Section offers a brief critique of some existing proposals for
limited judicial review of unilateral executive targeting determinations.
41. See Kevin Jon Heller, The Folly of Comparing al-Awlaki to General Yamamoto, OPINIo JUIS
(Oct. 1, 2011, 8:29 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2on/1o/o/the-folly-of-comparing-al
-awlaki-to-admiral-yamamoto. This criticism holds however understandable the desire to
avoid rewarding terrorists who violate the laws of war. For a discussion of how outlawry
resolves the dilemma, see infra Section III.C.
42. Johnson, supra note 40.
43. BLUM & HEYMANN, supra note 21, at 79.
44. Scott Shane, U.S. Approval of Killing of Cleric Causes Unease, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2olo/o5/14/world/14awlaki.html.
45. Afsheen John Radsan & Richard Murphy, The Evolution of Law and Policy for CIA Targeted
Killing, 5 J. NAT'L SECUIUTY L. & POL'Y 439, 463 (2012).
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1. Civil Action
In 2009, Professors Murphy and Radsan used the due process model that
emerged from the Court's detainment decisions as a basis for arguing that
Bivens-style private civil actions could enable targets to challenge the legality of
their placement on the kill list after an attack.4' The proposal conceded that the
role for the courts under such a schema would be "vanishingly small," but
deserves mention for offering a form of limited judicial scrutiny designed to
establish executive accountability with minimal harm to national security."
Yet in the wake of Awlaki's killing, ex post review of the Executive's
targeting determinations is unsatisfactory for obvious reasons. The strategy
assumes that the target would be alive to bring such a challenge or that a next
friend would be able to bring an unmooted claim.48 Certainly, the adequacy of
an ex ante approach has been directly called into question by Nasser al-Aulaqi's
failure to obtain standing to challenge his son's targeting in 2010. Although
whether the approach proves entirely unavailing ex post, in the wake of the
target's death, remains to be seen,4 under Judge Bates's interpretation of the
political question doctrine, the "vanishingly small" role that civil action offers
the judiciary appears to vanish to nothing.
2. Trial in Absentia
A full trial stands in dramatic contrast to ex post review and its minimal
protections. Although commencing a capital trial against an absent defendant
has no basis in the common law tradition,"o the idea of trying prospective
46. Murphy & Radsan, supra note 30, at 410.
47. Id. at 450.
48. Professors Murphy and Radsan anticipated this criticism, and acknowledged additional
hurdles to Bivens-style actions, such as the state-secrets privilege. Id. at 443. They went so
far as to predict that courts might be inclined to treat targeted killings as a political question.
Id. at 444. But their response was to focus their attention on advocating for a robust form of
"independent, intra-executive" review to offset the resulting limitations on the judicial role.
Id. at 445; see also Afsheen John Radsan & Richard Murphy, Measure Twice, Shoot Once:
Higher Care for CIA-Targeted Killing, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 1201 (proposing rigorous
independent executive review in conducting drone killings).
49. On July 18, 2012, the ACLU and the Center for Constitutional Rights filed a new lawsuit
seeking damages for the deaths of Awlaki, Khan, and Awlaki's sixteen-year-old son. See
Press Release, ACLU, Rights Groups File Challenge to Killings of Three Americans in U.S.
Drone Strikes (July 18, 2012), http-://www.aclu.org/national-security/rights-groups-file
-challenge-killings-three-americans-us-drone-strikes.
50. More specifically, the practice of outlawry left no room for trial in absentia at English
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targets in absentia in the United States has gained some traction as the most
rigorous possible form of pre-targeting review."
But the idea has also been panned as "wildly impracticable"s2 and "time-
wasting."s" It is not merely that a full trial implicates all of the concerns that
have long buttressed arguments for trying terrorists through military tribunals
rather than in civilian courts.' Trials conducted in absentia have the added
distinction of forcing the government to build a court case against a defendant
who has yet to be successfully apprehended.ss This magnifies the problems
common law. James G. Starkey, Trial in Absentia, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 721, 722-23 (1979).
Historically, the Supreme Court's concern has been whether such a trial violates due process,
namely by denying the defendant his constitutional right to be present at his own trial. See,
e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-o8 (1934) (concluding that due process
requires the defendant's presence only to the extent that his absence would thwart a fair and
just hearing). Much like outlawry, rather than regarded as a paragon of process, trial in
absentia has suffered criticisms for its "totalitarian imagery." Starkey, supra, at 742. Trial in
absentia and outlawry suffer the same potential legal problem-a lack of clearly expressed
intent on the part of the would-be defendant to waive the constitutional right in question.
See infra Section W.B.
s. See, e.g., Juan Cole, Al-'Awlaqi Should Have Been Tried in Absentia, INFORMED COMMENT,
(Oct. 1, 2011), http://www.juancole.com/20l/lo/al-awlaqi-should-have-been-tried-in
-absentia.html.
52. Radsan & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1239.
s3. Editorial, Justifying the Killing of an American, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 11, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/io/12/opinion/justifying-the-killing-of-an-american.htm1.
54. See Harvey Rishikof, Is It Time for a Federal Terrorist Court? Terrorists and Prosecutions:
Problems, Paradigms, and Paradoxes, 8 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADvoc. 1, 8 (2003) (laying out
the five critical ways in which military commissions differ from federal trials, and the
George W. Bush Administration's argument that these differences allowed the government
"to safeguard classified information, provide security for court personnel, remain flexible as
the war evolved, and accommodate the broad range of evidence gathered"). For example, in
the targeting context, one concern is that the evidentiary bar in federal court would be
"impossibly high." David Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr.
2006, at 95.
ss. The fact that other countries have tried terrorists in absentia with seeming success does not
alone support initiating similar proceedings in the United States. For example, a Yemeni
court tried Awlaki in absentia in November 2010, while his father's lawsuit was pending in
D.C. district court. See Anwar al-Awlaki Charged in Yemen with Crimes Against Foreigners,
TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 2, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in
-the-uk/8o 4 321/Anwar-al-Awlaki-charged-in-Yemen-with-crimes-against-foreigners.html.
Awlaki was eventually sentenced to ten years in prison. Jake Tapper, The U.S. Case Against
Awlaki, ABC NEws (Sept. 30, 2011, 10:40 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2o1/o9
/the-us-case-against-awlaki. But the Yemeni judiciary has also been described as weak and
dependent, and the country faces recurring allegations of unfair trials. Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights & Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2o1: Yemen, U.S.
DEP'T OF ST. 9-10 (2011), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186667.pdf. For
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associated with a normal federal trial, which involves everything from a civilian
grand jury to a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The national security concerns that arise out of a public trial suggest that
the court should be permitted to assess the evidence in camera." This model
offers the accused important procedural protections like notice, but otherwise
suffers all of the problems I attribute to secret killing courts.
3. A Targeted Killing Court
Commentators have clamored around proposals for the creation of a special
targeted killing court.s7 The court would exist "beyond the executive echo
chamber,"s" but its accelerated, closed-door procedures would preclude many
of the problems associated with normal trials.
David Byman is among those who have argued in this vein for an elaborate
system of target-vetting procedures, both within the executive branch and in
the form of judicial review.s9 His judicial model contains two possible prongs.
A Justice Department official insulated from the executive branch could vet the
secret intelligence used to identify targets fo Additionally, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court could create a court "capable of rapid action if necessary,"
another example, consider the tainted terrorism trials stirring controversy in Algeria. See
Algeria: Long Delays Tainting Terrorism Trials, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 18, 2012),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2o2/o6/18/algeria-long-delays-tainting-terrorism-trials.
56. See, e.g., David Husband, The Targeted Killing of Al-Awlaki, HARv. NAT'L SECURITY J.
ONLINE (Nov. 26, 2011, 5:o8 PM), http://harvardnsj.org/2o1i/ui/the-targeted-killing-of-al
-awlaki.
57. See, e.g., MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR 134
(2004); Murphy & Radsan, supra note 30, at 449; Editorial, The Power To Kill, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.con/2o12/o3/11/opinion/sunday/the-power-to-kill
.html; Editorial, When the Government Kills, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 2012,
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul29/opinion/la-ed-drone-killings-lawsit-20120729.
s8. Editorial, Justifying the Killing ofan American, supra note 53.
59. Byman, supra note 54, at 95.
6o. Id. at iii. This is distinguishable from proposals for a procedure entirely internal to the
executive branch. See, e.g., Carla Crandall, Ready . . . Fire . .. Aim! A Case for Applying
American Due Process Principles Before Engaging in Drone Strikes, 24 FLA. J. INT'L L. 55 (2012)
(advocating for the creation of a prestrike review tribunal that resembles combatant status
review tribunals). A special executive court with exclusive killing oversight has been likened
to the Star Chamber, a seventeenth-century English venue for death panels deployed against
the King's political enemies and religious dissenters. See Ryan Patrick Alford, The Rule of
Law at the Crossroads: Consequences of Targeted Killing of Citizens, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1203,
1223-24, 1249; Doug Mataconis, There Really Is a Death Panel, OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY (Oct.
6, 2011), http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/there-really-is-a-death-panel.
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much like the FISA court, which is authorized under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act to conduct ex parte review of the government's wiretapping
requests."
In theory, establishing a special court to review targeting determinations is
a logical compromise between no trial and full trial. By giving the judiciary the
power to substantively assess whether lethal force against a particular citizen is
well founded, the court would offer prospective targets the benefits of ex ante,
case-by-case review and ostensibly serve as a major check on the Executive's
use of lethal force. But a closer examination reveals that a secret killing court is
the worst of both worlds: it affords the prospective target insufficient
protections while limiting the judiciary to discharging a responsibility that falls
outside of its purview.
On the first point, a secret killing court would be subject to all of the
criticisms levied at the FISA court, whose closed doors and sealed records make
for an inscrutable process by which government requests for surveillance
warrants are granted seemingly as a matter of course.2 In the targeting realm,
however, this opacity would translate into due process denial: ex parte court
proceedings shrouded in secrecy would preclude an accused terrorist from
laying claim to the opportunity to contribute to the decision that may lead to
his killing."
For example, the Obama Administration refused to concede Awlaki was a
target even when moving to dismiss the lawsuit filed by Awlaki's father. This
secrecy rendered impracticable the two avenues of redress that Judge Bates
suggested were available to a target willing to challenge his placement on the
government's kill list: peacefully surrendering to an embassy, in which case the
government would be barred from killing him as a matter of domestic and
international law,64 or challenging his placement on the target list using
videoconferencing technology. 6s Both "solutions" to the standing problem are
illusory for targets as a general matter because they require the target to be
aware of his target status.6 6 Although that information was leaked in the high-
61. Byman, supra note 54, at in1. For a brief discussion of the FISA court, see infra Subsection
III.B.i.
62. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Updating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 225
(2008); Jeremy D. Mayer, 9-11 and the Secret FISA Court: From Watchdog to Lapdog?, 34 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 249 (2oo2). It is not clear that the rate at which the court issues warrants
suggests rubber-stamping. See infra Section III.B.
63. See supra text accompanying note 29.
64. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 7 27 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2010).
6S. Id. at 18 n.4.
66. Dehn & Heller, supra note 17, at 185 (Heller, Rebuttal). For a discussion of practical realities
740
122:724 2012
TARGETING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY OUTLAW
profile case of this particular radical cleric, neither option is clearly available to
future citizen-targets so long as the Executive is permitted to formally keep its
kill list a secret, and in the secret court context, submit its evidence for review
strictly in camera.
In 2008, former federal judge and then-Attorney General Michael Mukasey
summed up further problems with leaving difficult national security decisions
to the judiciary: "Judges decide particular cases, and they are limited to the
evidence and the legal arguments presented in those cases. They have no
independent way, or indeed authority, to find facts on their own, and they are
generally limited by the parties' presentations of background information and
expert testimony.",6  These limitations would be a special curse in ex parte
killing-court proceedings. The judiciary would be left without a meaningful
avenue for questioning the reliability or accuracy of the government's evidence.
Indeed, such questioning is already difficult in detainment cases where the
terror suspect is present and equipped with a defense team.6 ' Even if counsel
were appointed to represent the absent defendant,'6 as in a public trial in
absentia, it is unclear what value this would add in the way of challenging the
government's narrative. The court's role would necessarily be limited to
analyzing whether, given the Executive's presentation of its case, the
prospective target poses enough of a national security threat to warrant
execution.
The great irony of such a system is that it would amount to assigning the
judiciary a task over which the Executive rightfully has exclusive domain. The
system would thereby undermine, not promote, the proper balance of
that could preclude the surrender of the accused despite notice, see infra Subsection V.B.4.
67. Michael Mukasey, U.S. Attorney Gen., Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute (July
21, 20o8), http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2008/ag-speech-o807213.html; see
also WLLIAM REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAwS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 205 (1998)
("Judicial inquiry, with its restrictive rules of evidence, orientation towards resolution of
factual disputes in individual cases, and long delays, is ill-suited to determine an issue such
as 'military necessity."').
68. See, e.g., Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (conceding that a court conducting
detainee habeas proceedings must have the authority to assess the sufficiency of the
government's evidence, but affording the government's evidence a rebuttable "presumption
of regularity").
6g. Kevin Heller suggests that this might be a suitable alternative if the government "has reason
to believe that notifying the target of his status will cause him to disappear." Kevin Jon
Heller, The Washington Post on Al-Aulaqi, OPINIO JuRIS (Sept. 6, 2olo, 10:52 AM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2oio/o9/o6/the-washington-post-on-al-aulaqi. But while this is a
practical response to the government's resistance to publicizing the CIA's list of American
targets, it does not translate into a legitimate legal substitute for notice. See infra Subsection
V.B.3.
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powers. 70  For despite insisting on some amount of judicially enforced
protection against government interference with fundamental individual
liberties,71 the courts have also recognized the need for judicial restraint when it
comes to substantively reviewing the content of the Executive's national
security assessments.7 ' The courts have likewise deferred to the Executive's
legal and policy arguments in cases that turn on evaluating foreign
intelligence.7 1
The judiciary's longstanding tradition of declining to review the
Executive's assessments of what constitutes a national security threat presents a
formidable challenge to any proposal that places the substance of target status
determinations in the hands of the courts. Although this Note will argue that
courts have a critical role to play in negotiating the line between national
security and individual rights, in the targeting context, that role properly takes
70. I do not explore the institutional damage that could result from requiring judges to assess
the substance of executive targeting determinations, but Benjamin Wittes has voiced
compelling concerns about the long-term consequences of "judicializing intelligence and ...
implicating federal judges in the dirtiest work of the intelligence community." Benjamin
Wittes, Thoughts in Response to Spencer Ackerman #2, LAWFARE (Oct. 2, 2011, 10:01 PM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2ou/lo/thoughts-in-response-to-spencer-ackerman-2.
71. See supra Section I.A.
72. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2711 (2010) ("[R]espect for
the Government's factual conclusions is appropriate in light of the courts' lack of expertise
with respect to national security and foreign affairs, and the reality that efforts to confront
terrorist threats occur in an area where information can be difficult to obtain, the impact of
certain conduct can be difficult to assess, and conclusions must often be based on informed
judgment rather than concrete evidence.").
73. See Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) ("[E]ven if
courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign
policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the
political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative . . . ."). Although
Waterman has been described as an old case, see Air Line Pilots' Ass'n Int'l v. Dep't of
Transp., 446 F.2d 236, 24o (5th Cir. 1971), the above-quoted language remains an influential
articulation of the Executive's distinct powers. For example, in People's Mojahedin
Organization of Iran v. U.S. Department of State, 182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999), the D.C.
Circuit relied on Waterman to hold that whether the activities of a designated terrorist
organization threatened national security amounted to a political judgment outside the
court's purview. See id. at 23; see also Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have
Ears: The Background and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 793, 803-04 (1989) (citing the decisions of four federal courts of appeals that
accepted a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement, often based on the
potential negative impact of judicial interference). In United States v. U.S. District Court, 407
U.S. 297 (1972), the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment required the
government to obtain a warrant to conduct domestic security surveillance, but emphasized
that the decision concerned strictly the surveillance of domestic organizations without
significant foreign connection. Id. at 308-09, 321-22.
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the form of procedural, not substantive, appraisals of when due process has
been denied.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF OUTLAWRY
The practice of outlawry has been wrongly equated with the denial of due
process. But characterizing outlawry as a lawless edict unilaterally imposed by
the king- "hang[ing] someone out to dry by decree"'- overlooks the
evolution and centuries-long use of outlawry as a court-issued legal judgment.
In this Part, I explore outlawry as a mechanism for administering justice to
untried fugitives at English common law, in the American colonies, and in the
individual states. I do not argue that outlawry was consistently fair in practice;
rather, I seek to show that at various points in history its legal validity as a
court-issued judgment was predicated on the observation of compelling
procedural principles. The evidence suggests that, in its best form, outlawry
does not amount to punishment at the cost of process -its lawful use requires
due process.75
A. Theory and Procedure at English Common Law
Historically, to be declared an outlaw was to be cast outside the law's
protection. 6 Among the oldest of weapons at English common law, outlawry
was a legal remedy that conditioned the accused felon's rights on his
willingness to submit himself to the law.' A fugitive of justice who denied the
law's authority was in turn denied the law's protections with respect to both
his property and physical person. 8
In its oldest forms, outlawry was the harshest of judgments. Before the
Conquest, no one could be held responsible for injuring or killing an outlaw.7
74- Id.
75. Professor May makes a similar observation in his work on the procedural values enshrined
in the Magna Carta and their implications for for international law and Guantanamo
detention policies. May, Magna Carta, supra note 9, at 95, 101. A focus on procedural justice,
rather than substantive justice, also informs this Note, but in the context of domestic law
and specifically in the form of outlawry.
76. 3 WiLLiMi BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *319-
77. Richards, supra note 1, at 298.
78. 12 THE NEW AMERICAN CYCLOPAEDIA: A PopuLAR DIcTIoNARY OF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE 615
(George Ripley & Charles A. Dana eds., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1869) [hereinafter
THE NEW AMEIcAN CYCLOPAEDIA].
79. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 214; Frederick Pollock, Anglo-Saxon Law, 8 ENG. HIsT. REV. 260
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This was because the fugitive's flight constituted an act of war: "He who
breaks the law has gone to war with the community; the community goes to
war with him."so Under this logic, an individual "rebelli[ng] against the
organic law of the state ... certainly cannot complain if those who are intrusted
with the maintenance of the social order and welfare declare that he has
forfeited the benefits and privileges of the law to which he refuses to submit. "'
Two practical factors explain the severity of outlawry in the later Anglo-
Saxon period: the challenges of obtaining specific evidence of the offense in
question, and the difficulties associated with compelling accused and suspected
persons to submit themselves to the legal process." Frederick Pollock and
Frederic Maitland also noted that in England, outlawry was originally reserved
for the worst crimes." As outlawry ceased to be punishment and was reduced
to mere process, it was extended, and eventually restricted, to minor offenses."
This distinction between outlawry as punishment and outlawry as process
is a critical one, and useful for assessing what aspects of outlawry would prove
effective in the modern counterterrorism context. Outlawry as a judgment for
capital crimes was fundamentally different in form and function from outlawry
against parties to lesser crimes and civil actions.8" In misdemeanor cases,
outlawry was a sanction for contempt of court, and in civil cases, it was
primarily a means for compelling court appearance; in neither instance did the
judgment of outlawry itself function as a conviction.86 In cases of treason or
felony, however, outlawry was a substantive punishment for criminals who
fled judgment, particularly for those who displayed violent resistance to the
legal process or persistent contempt of court.' Their flight amounted to a
confession of guilt for the crime charged, and in their absence they were
outlawed and subject to execution without trial. 8 He who was outlawed on a
(1893).
So. 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 1449 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1996) (2d ed. 1898).
81. 12 THE NEw AMERICAN CYCLOPAEDIA, supra note 78, at 615.
82. Pollock, supra note 79, at 260.
83. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 8o, at 450.
84. Id. at 45o n.2.
85. Richards, supra note I, at 298-99.
86. See Nathan Levy, Jr., Mesne Process in Personal Actions at Common Law and the Power Doctrine,
78 YALE L.J. 52, 81 (1968).
87. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 80, at 49-
a8. Richards, supra note i, at 298. Henry Bracton distinguished true outlawry from presumptive
outlawry: true outlawry involved flight after a felonious breach of the peace in the form of
assault or homicide, while presumptive outlawry was flight from legal action, however
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capital crime or sentenced to death was also instantly "attainted" -the effects of
which included corruption of the blood as well as forfeiture of estate.
As all punishment and no process, early outlawry presented great potential
for misuse.9 o The passage of the Magna Carta in 1215 did not instantly
transform outlawry into a fair or consistently effective practice,9 ' but it ushered
in a new era of judicial outlawry by providing that a person could be outlawed
only by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the "law of the land." The due
process norms embodied in the "law of the land" provision were "designed to
secure the subject against the arbitrary action of the crown and place him under
the protection of the law." As a formal stripping of the right to this process, a
judgment of outlawry could henceforth be lawfully rendered by a court only in
accordance with established judicial procedures.
English outlawry proceedings varied according to place and time period,
but they generally involved certain basic procedural prerequisites: charges,
minor the offense. 2 HENRY BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 356-57
(George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (1554).
89. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at *374.
go. Before the passage of the Magna Carta, individuals who presented a political threat to the
Crown could be arbitrarily declared outlaws and have their property confiscated. King John
notoriously abused outlawry for his own financial gain and to eliminate his enemies under
the pretense of process. See JAMES CLARKE HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 109 (2d ed. 1992); Ifor W.
Rowlands, King John and Wales, in KING JOHN: NEW INTERPRETATIONS 273, 286 (S.D.
Church ed., 1999).
91. For example, by the mid-fourteenth century, outlawry had deteriorated in large part because
of the ease and regularity with which outlaws eluded the law. See E.L.G. Stones, The Folvilles
of Ashby-Folville, Leicestershire, and Their Associates in Crime, 1326-1347, 7 TRANSACTIONS
ROYAL HIST. Soc., FIFTH SERIES 117, 132 (1957) (attributing the fourteenth-century legal
system's failures in bringing "notorious felons" to justice to police inefficiency and the
Crown's lax issuance of pardons). Although Edward I instituted trailbaston commissions in
1304, sending royal justices to local counties ostensibly to effectuate the law, the
commissions were unpopular and viewed as, among other things, a corrupt means for the
Crown to exact profit. See MICHAEL PRESTWICH, EDWARD I, at 286-87 (2d ed. 1997).
92. Magna Carta ch. 29, reprinted and translated in A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT
AND COMMENTARY 43 (1964); see WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 214-15.
93. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889). The Supreme Court has recognized "the law
of the land" provision as the predecessor of Fifth Amendment "due process." Id. at 123-24;
see also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 533 (1884) ("Due process of law is process
according to the law of the land." (quoting Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 93 (1875))). For
an account of the English barons' attempt to protect themselves from the King's arbitrary
use of outlawry, see F.M. Powicke, Per ludicium Parium vel per Legem Terrae, in MAGNA
CARTA COMMEMORATION ESSAYS 96, 103 (Henry Elliot Malden ed., 2d prtg. 2006), which
explains that "the thirty-ninth clause [of the Magna Carta] was intended to lay stress not so
much on any particular form of trial as on the necessity for protection against the arbitrary
acts of imprisonment, disseisin, and outlawry in which King John had indulged."
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notice, successive summonses, and the suspect's repeated failures to appear.
Before Bracton's time in the thirteenth century, outlawry proceedings began
with either the indictment of the accused felon or an "appeal" brought by an
aggrieved party.9 4 If the accused did not appear before the King's justices upon
indictment, the justices would assess evidence of his guilt and accordingly
direct that he be "exacted" and outlawed.9' The appealed individual was
required to appear in county court to avoid a similar fate.96
The exacting process required a court to issue a writ of capias ad
respondendum in the county where the prosecution commenced, instructing the
sheriff to take the individual into custody.9 7 If the accused was not found in the
jurisdiction, the court would issue a writ of exigifacias, requiring the sheriff to
summon the accused at five successive court proceedings.'" Under thirteenth-
century law, no man could be declared an outlaw until he was demanded at five
successive county courts. 99
Changes to outlawry proceedings over time suggest some sensitivity to
outlawry's fairness as a legal judgment. For example, murder, arson, rape,
maiming, and larceny were among the thirteenth-century felonies that
warranted outlawry and execution.oo But in response to the increasing use of
common law imprisonment in the case of misdemeanors, a 1295 statute
stipulated that private citizens could not kill prison escapees as presumptive
outlaws,o' signaling an interest in meting out punishment proportionate to the
underlying crime. By the fourteenth century, no longer were private citizens
permitted to kill the outlaw upon sight."o' During the fifteenth century,
94. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 80, at 581. The initial summons in an appeal generally
involved no writ. Id.
95. Id. at 581-82.
g6. Id.
97. Richards, supra note I, at 302.
9s. Id.
gg. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 8o, at 539. Often the accused failed to appear. Susan
Stewart, Outlawry as an Instrument of Justice in the Thirteenth Century, in OUTLAWS IN
MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN ENGLAND: CRIME, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY, c. io66-c.
16oo, at 37, 41 (John C. Appleby & Paul Dalton eds., 2009).
ioo. Stewart, supra note 99, at 40.
ol. See Statutum de Frangentibus Prisonam [Statute of Breaking Prisons], 23 Edw. (1295)
(U.K.) ("Concerning prisoners which break prison, our lord and king willeth and
commandeth, that none from henceforth that breaketh prison shall have judgement of life
or member for breaking of prison only, except the cause for which he was taken and
imprisoned did require such judgment. . . ." (spelling modernized)).
102. See Ralph B. Pugh, Early Registers ofEnglish Outlaws, 27 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 319, 319 (1983).
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provisions dictating wider promulgation of the indictment were designed to
give the suspect sufficient notice and opportunity to appear."o3
That a judgment of outlawry was subject to challenge and reversal is
perhaps the most powerful evidence of meaningful limits on its lawful use. For
example, in the famous 1234 case of Hubert de Burgh, the prison escapee was
declared a rebel by the King but had his outlawry declared null on the grounds
that he had been neither indicted nor appealed.104 In general, the severity of
outlawry as a punishment and the potential for its abuse "always inclined the
Courts to strain every point in favour of the applicant" seeking a reversal of
outlawry.os For instance, the fact that the defendant was outlawed while
outside the country and therefore deprived of notice was a ground for finding
error.o6 A sixteenth-century statute took away this ground in cases of treason,
but compensated for the deprivation with a one-year grace period during
which time the outlaw could surrender, reverse the judgment, and reclaim his
right to trial.'0o
In 1879, the Commissioners' Report on the Criminal Code Bill concluded
that outlawry had been effectively superseded by extradition and should be
abolished."o In 1901, Sir Henry Erle Richards penned a plea for the
resurrection of the obsolete but still-legitimate practice of outlawry as the only
viable means for bringing fugitives accused of high treason to justice where
extradition treaties failed.'09
103. Sir Richards details several statutes passed during the reigns of Henry V and Henry VI.
Richards, supra note 1, at 302-03.
104. 1 POLLOCK& MAITLAND, supra note 80, at 581.
os. Richards, supra note i, at 300. According to Blackstone, a judgment of outlawry could be
reversed for "any irregularity, omission or want of form." 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at
*391. The late thirteenth century marked the Crown's attempts to bring outlawry under
centralized control, which resulted in fundamental changes to the practice. Melissa Sartore,
Outlawry, Governance and Law in Medieval England 239 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison) (on file with University of Wisconsin-
Madison). For example, pardons blunted the force of a proclamation of outlawry and
increased the importance of imprisonment. Id. at 234.
106. See Richards, supra note i, at 300.
107. Id. The outlaw was entitled to reversal for only a year because if trial by jury were
guaranteed irrespective of when he chose to surrender, he would have an incentive to return
to the jurisdiction only upon the deaths of the witnesses against him. Id. at 301.
ios. Id. at 303. The English courts kept elaborate records of outlawry from at least the late
fourteenth century until 1870. Pugh, supra note 102, at 329 & n.76. By another account, 1855
was the last recorded date when an English court rendered a judgment of outlawry. Robert
E. Lee, Only Three States Permit a Man To Be Declared an Outlaw, DISPATCH (Lexington,
N.C.), Dec. 4, 1963, at 2.
log. See Richards, supra note 1, at 303-04. Outlawry in criminal proceedings was not abolished
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B. Judicial Outlawry in the American Colonies and the Individual States
As noted by the Second Circuit a century after the fact, outlawry was
exported from England to the American colonies with some vigor."o Outlawry
enjoyed protracted existence, and rare use,' as a weapon of last resort against
fugitives in the United States well into the twentieth century. The practice of
outlawry in Pennsylvania and North Carolina, among the last states to retain
outlawry as a legal sanction,"' helps illustrate its adaptation for use by a three-
branch republic.
A judgment of outlawry in colonial Pennsylvania amounted to a conviction
and sentence."' If a person indicted of any one of several specified offenses
either did not appear in court to answer the indictment or escaped before trial,
the indictment was removed to the state supreme court. 4 If the person failed
to appear for trial, the court could outlaw him and declare him attainted of the
crime for which he was indicted, which had the legal effect of a verdict.s A
fugitive indicted and outlawed for treason or other specified crimes could be
lawfully executed." 6 The execution was not conducted by just any vigilante; it
was rather the duty of the President of the Pennsylvania Supreme Executive
Council to see that a warrant for execution was carried out."'
The Executive Council President's refusal to carry out one such warrant in
in 1784 set the stage for a major commonwealth controversy. From 1782
through 1784, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had instituted outlawry
proceedings against seventeen members and associates of the Doan family for
criminal activities related to aiding the British during the Revolutionary
War.,8 Described as the terrorists of their time,"' the Doans persisted in
until 1938. Administration ofJustice Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 63, § 12 (Eng.).
lio. United States v. Hall, 198 F.2d 726, 727 (1952).
111. 12 THE NEW AMERICAN CYCLOPAEDIA, supra note 78, at 616.
112. FRANK RICHARD PRASSEL, THE GREAT AMEIuCAN OUTLAW: A LEGACY OF FACT AND FICTION
107-08 (1993).
113. Id. For a description of outlawry proceedings as modified by statute in 1791, see 1 JOHN
PURDON, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA, FROM THE YEAR ONE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED TO THE TENTH DAY OF JULY, ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-
Two 623-26 (1824).
114. PURDON, supra note 113, at 623, 625.
115. See id. at 624.
116. See PRASSEL, supra note 112, at 107.
117. See Gail S. Rowe, Outlawry in Pennsylvania, 1782-1788 and the Achievement of an Independent
State Judiciary, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 227, 233 (1976).
118. Id. at 230-31.
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intimidating any county citizen who attempted to assist their capture."o
In 1784, when Aaron Doan was captured, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
issued a death sentence against him despite the efforts of Doan's attorneys to
reverse his outlawry."' When Executive Council President Dickinson
questioned the legality of using outlawry proceedings to deny Doan a jury trial
and refused to carry out the warrant for Doan's execution,' the supreme court
determined that outlawry in general and its application to Doan in particular
did not violate the state constitution."' Conviction by way of outlawry did not
constitute the state depriving the fugitive of a jury trial; the fugitive had denied
himself that right by refusing to submit to the proper authorities."
Dickinson remained free to exercise executive prerogative to pardon Doan
or grant him reprieve; the legislature could also abolish the use of outlawry in
future cases.' But the court found that separation-of-powers principles
prohibited the court itself from acquiescing to executive pressure by changing
the law or refusing to properly apply it to Doan."
In the targeted killing context, the pressures are, of course, reversed:
unrestrained executive power takes the form of unilaterally ordering the
execution of the accused without a trial rather than impeding it. But the case
still provides a useful example of a court's ability to assess the legitimacy of an
individual's outlaw status independently and irrespective of the Executive's
preferences. According to one scholar, the Doan case allowed for the emergence
of "a clearer appreciation and articulation of the separation of powers doctrine"
in Pennsylvania in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War.'
North Carolina was the last state to declare a fugitive from justice an
iig. A group of county residents who had been subjected to the Doans' "reign of terror" opposed
the reversal of Aaron Doan's judgment of outlawry and condemned any effort by either the
Council or the Pennsylvania Assembly to help "the two terrorists" escape execution. Id. at 242.
120. Id. at 231.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 233.
123. Respublica v. Doan, 1 Dall. 86, 93 (Pa. 1784).
124. Id. at 90-91.
125. Rowe, supra note 117, at 238.
126. Id. In 1787, Dickinson's successor, Benjamin Franklin, pardoned the still-incarcerated Doan,
who returned to a life of crime in New Jersey before absconding to Canada. Id. at 24o.
127. Id. at 244. The confusion arising out of the Doan case also persuaded the Pennsylvania
legislature to pass a new bill in 1791 that established clearer and more lenient outlawry
procedures. JACK D. MARIETrA & G.S. ROWE, TROUBLED EXPERIMENT: CRIME AND JUSTICE
IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1682-18oo, at 213 (2oo6).
749
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
outlaw executable upon sight.128 The state statute "empowered and required"
judges who received information that a person had committed a felony and had
evaded arrest and service of "the usual processes of law" to issue a
proclamation demanding the fugitive's surrender.12 9 In contrast with outlawry
proceedings in Pennsylvania, which charged the Executive Council President
with enforcing a warrant for an outlaw's execution, the North Carolina statute
enabled private citizens to seek out the outlaw and kill him if he persisted in
resisting surrender.'
The law was put into practice well into the twentieth century. In 1960,
escaped prison inmate Robert Tyson, wanted for murder and rape, was
formally outlawed. He committed suicide before he could be captured."' In
1962, a court declared Jack Harvey Davis an outlaw after he sawed his way out
of a prison cell. 3 2 In 1975, a superior court judge proclaimed a judgment of
outlawry against Morrey Joe Campbell, who was charged with murder and
assault."' In 1975, Arthur Parrish was outlawed in connection with a gruesome
grocery store murder.3 3 The criminal outlawry statute was declared
unconstitutional by a federal court for specific procedural deficiencies in 1976
but was not formally repealed until 1997.us
C. Extrajudicial Outlawry in the United States
The many procedural safeguards upon which outlawry's lawfulness had
been predicated since the time of the Magna Carta were most conspicuously
discarded during the American Civil War. Extrajudicial execution in wartime
resembled the brutal caricature of outlawry that now persists in the popular
and legal imagination. The following review of its legacy in American history
128. PRASSEL, supra note 112, at 107.
129. Act of Mar. 1, 1866, ch. 62, § 1, 1866 N.C. Sess. Laws 125, 125 (repealed 1997).
130. Id.; see Nation: The Outlaws of 197o, TIME, Apr. 20, 1970, http://www.time.com/time
/magazine/article/o,9171,944o11,oo.html. It bears noting that the history of North
Carolina's outlawry law is racially fraught. The statute was enacted specifically in response
to the activities of the Lowry gang after the Civil War. See id. at 1o8. That said, the state
constitution recognized outlawry as a sanction subject to legal process: "No person shall
be ... outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by
the law of the land." N.C. CONST. art. I, S 19.
131. See PRASSEL, supra note 112, at 107.
132. See This Is the Law: Outlaws ... ,DISPATCH (Lexington, N.C.), Nov. 5,1975, at 2.
133. See id.
134. Tiede, supra note 6.
135. See infra Part V.
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serves two functions: it helps explain how outlawry became so widely reviled
in the modern era and offers a critical glimpse of what twenty-first century
outlawry must not be - death by fiat.
According to historian Stephen Ambrose, the Union's official position
during the war was that the Southern states had never successfully seceded,
which meant that from the Union perspective, traditional rules of warfare did
not protect Confederate soldiers. " Their engagement in hostilities amounted
to rebellion. 3 7 By another account, the lack of a command presence in states
like Missouri meant that the Confederate forces in those regions consisted of
guerrilla bands waging "independent war" against the Union,' 8 which helped
Union leaders justify a practice of immediate execution of those civilians
suspected of involvement in hostilities. 139  Volatile battle conditions
undermined the formation of any consistent military policy, but the Union
stance was clear in one respect: as outlaws, active guerrillas were to be regularly
executed when captured in arms rather than taken alive as prisoners of war.o
Pursuant to orders promulgated during the Civil War by President
Lincoln's first General-in-Chief, Henry Halleck, extrajudicial outlawry was
used to justify the execution of Confederate guerrillas even when capture was
feasible or the guerrillas were willing to surrender.' In an 1862 order, General
Halleck declared that "every man who enlists in [a guerrilla band], forfeits his
life and becomes an outlaw."' It was left to the field officers to distinguish the
outlaw from the noncombatant.4 3 The soldiers' recurring attempts to justify
the Union's policy of executing captured Confederates, who in Missouri were
little more than civilians in arms, suggest lurking doubts as to the policy's
moral and legal legitimacy.'44
136. see STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, HALLECK: LINCOLN'S CHIEF OF STAFF 129 (1962).
137. Id.
138. MICHAEL FELLMAN, INSIDE WAR: THE GUERRILLA CONFLICT IN MISSOURI DURING THE
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 112 (198 9).
139. Id. at 168.
140. Id. at 123.
141. See id. Although the practice was neither official nor uniform, "in general and whenever they
wished, Union troops shot or hanged their captives, as did their guerrilla foes." Id. at 168.
142. Id. at 88 (citation omitted).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 123. The Union field officers "fully understood the vagueness of the line between
civilian and guerrilla and brought conflicting hopes and fears to bear on just who the enemy
was, and how he was to be treated." Id. at 113. Michael Fellman's description of the Union
quandary over the appropriate treatment of hostile Confederate civilians suggests some
profound parallels with the ongoing controversy over the Obama Administration's policy of
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The end of the Civil War heralded the American movement toward actively
abolishing outlawry.'4 ' The Virginia legislature repealed the state's outlawry
statutes,'14 the Alabama Supreme Court declared the judgment of outlawry
repugnant to the state constitution,147 and Texas used the declaration of rights
in its new constitution to prohibit outlawry permanently.18
But the uncomfortable legacy of Civil War outlawry includes a significant
historical twist. The same General Halleck who promulgated the orders upon
which Confederate guerrillas were killed as outlaws -without the involvement
of the courts -eventually commissioned legal scholar Francis Lieber to write a
uniform set of instructions for the conduct of soldiers in the field and the
treatment of civilian guerrillas.4' The result was the enormously influential
Lieber Code, signed by Abraham Lincoln as the first modern codification of the
laws of war,'5 0 and which later shaped the Hague and Geneva Conventions.''
The Code included a ban on outlawry in times of both war and peace, and it
helped set the weight of moral law against outlawry by characterizing the
practice as fundamentally inhumane:
targeting citizens:
[L]imited in their military means; torn between softs and hards; uncertain about
the appropriateness and effectiveness of all imaginable policies; their soldiers
pinned down in their posts in a countryside dominated by guerrillas, making their
men as much the hunted as the hunters; diffused by their own ambivalences and
uncertainties, Union military authorities would never construct a satisfactory
policy to respond to this guerrilla war.
Id. at 97.
145. PRASSEL, supra note 112, at io6.
146. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-10 (20o8).
147. Dale County v. Gunter, 46 Ala. 118, 139 (1871). The Alabama Supreme Court focused on the
implications of denying the outlaw the ability to bring action for redress of injuries, as the
result was "if not inconsistent with the letter of our bill of rights," nevertheless inconsistent
with its spirit. Id. In the modem context, provisions for the reversal of outlawry upon the
fugitive's surrender would mitigate this problem. See infra Section V.B.4.
148. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 20.
149. AMBROSE, supra note 136, at 128.
150. LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 36 (3d ed. 2008). For
evidence that the Lieber Code also marked the first time military commissions were
definitively granted jurisdiction to try law-of-war violations, and an extended discussion of
military commissions as General Halleck's creative legal solution to combating Confederate
guerrillas, see Gideon M. Hart, Military Commissions and the Lieber Code: Toward a New
Understanding of the Jurisdictional Foundations of Military Commissions, 203 MIL. L. REv. I
(2010).
151. RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAw OF WAR 1 (1983).
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The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual
belonging to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the hostile
government, an outlaw, who may be slain without trial by any captor,
any more than the modern law of peace allows such intentional
outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors such outrage."'
I argue this prohibition on outlawry should be understood in the context of
the extrajudicial outlawry that likely helped inspire it - that is, as a response to
the Union's dubious policy of treating captured civilians suspected of hostilities
as outlaws subject to extrajudicial execution. Put differently, the ban on
outlawry enshrined in the Lieber Code and adopted by so many international
conventions should be construed not as a ban on the court-issued outlawry that
emerged after centuries of evolving English practice, but instead as an
uncontroversial ban on extrajudicial assassination and other practices that can
be severed from outlawry.
Ill. THE CASE FOR OUTLAWRY-BASED TARGETED KILLING
The extrajudicial outlawry that was employed during the Civil War and
formed a basis for later international bans on outlawry is clearly not the kind of
outlawry that this Note proposes to revive. As Part II explained, outlawry saw
evolution before obsolescence. Through formal charges, notice, successive
summonses, and provisions for surrender, outlawry became a mechanism for
administering a unique blend of process and punishment: no process in excess
of what the accused needed to choose whether to submit to the law, and no
punishment in excess of what would have been warranted by his legal
conviction. This Part will argue that this is the proper formula for judicial
review in the targeted killing context.
In declining to rule on the merits of Awlaki's prospective killing, Judge
152. FRANCIS LIEBER, U.S. WAR DEP'T, General Orders No. 100, INSTRUCrIONS FOR THE
GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD, art. 148 (1863) [hereinafter
LIEBER CODE], reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF
CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCuMENTS 3, 18-19, 21 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri
Toman eds., 3d rev. ed. 2004); see also Memorandum from W. Hays Parks, Special Assistant
for Law of War Matters to the Judge Advocate Gen. of the Army, to the Office of the Judge
Advocate Gen. of the Army, Executive Order 12333 and Assassination (Nov. 2, 1989),
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Use%200f%/2oForce/October%202002/Parks-final.pdf
(describing Article 148 as the first description of what constitutes assassination conducted by
the U.S. military). The phrase "without trial by any captor" seems to allude specifically to
the practice of posse comitatus, which this Note argues need not be associated with outlawry.
See infra Section IV.A.
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Bates acknowledged the uncomfortable implications of all sides of the targeted
killing debate. Taken together, these concerns suggest the appeal of developing
a coherent procedural framework that permits but delimits the Executive's use
of lethal force against alleged citizen-terrorists in an age of nontraditional and
possibly infinite war. Using the "perplexing[] questions""s' that Judge Bates
raises but does not answer in his decision as a framing device, this Part makes a
three-part argument for employing outlawry principles to construct that much-
needed framework of limited judicial review.
A. Outlawry Provides Properly Limited Judicial Process in the Form of
Access to the Courts
Can the Executive order the assassination of a U.S. citizen without first
affording him any form of judicial process whatsoever, based on the mere
assertion that he is a dangerous member ofa terrorist organization? How can
the courts . .. make real-time assessments of the nature and severity of alleged
threats to national security, determine the imminence of those threats, weigh
the benefits and costs of possible diplomatic and military responses, and
ultimately decide whether, and under what circumstances, the use of military
force against such threats isjustified?54
At a conceptual level, modern-day outlawry proceedings amount to an
uncommonly straightforward death-eligibility process. In a departure from the
legal norm, the death eligibility of the prospective target would turn not on his
proven guilt but instead on his apparent recalcitrance, as evidenced by his
failure to respond to the measures taken by each of the three branches. As a
threshold matter, Congress would need to craft the outlawing process. In the
case of a particular prospective target, the Executive could then initiate the
process, while the courts would be charged with ensuring adherence to the
process.
In more concrete terms, under an outlawry statute, the Executive would be
able to exercise its traditional prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether and
when to bring a special category of charges against suspected citizen-
terrorists."ss Once the government has fulfilled, at minimum, the procedural
153. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2010).
154. Id. at 9.
155. Theoretically, the government could exaggerate the threat posed by a prospective target. But
outlawry proceedings are not unique in affording executive intelligence a significant degree
of deference. As discussed in Subsection I.B.3, evidence offered by the government is
allowed a presumption of regularity even in full criminal proceedings.
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protections outlined in Part V, infra, a suspect's failure to submit himself to
legal authorities would empower a court to issue a judgment of outlawry
against him.
Meanwhile, the judiciary would hold the power to declare a citizen an
"outlaw" based on a procedural definition of a legitimate target of lethal force: a
suspect who refuses to submit to the legal process, as defined by a set of
procedural requisites specified under statute, or perhaps left to the courts'
design. This form of judicial review is most notable for what it would not
involve: outlawry proceedings would not compel the judiciary to make real-
time assessments of the threat posed by individual targets, to determine when
the use of military force against such threats is justified, or to demand from the
Executive comprehensive proof that use of lethal force is warranted.
From a civil libertarian viewpoint, a defining feature of outlawry
proceedings might be the constructive preservation of the choice of legal
process. Outlawry would avoid rubber-stamping the Executive's targeted
killing decisions by forcing the Executive to observe a number of critical basics,
like issuing notice and formal charges. The target would be thereby afforded a
role in precluding his own killing, and the target and the public provided some
basis for alleging trumped-up charges of terrorist involvement.
Concedely, outlawry offers the prospective target highly circumscribed
protections. Not trial, but the right to trial."56 Not individualized notice, but
centralized notice.' 7 Not express waiver, but implied waiver."" As such,
outlawry is unlikely to actually fully satisfy the civil libertarians, and is
vulnerable to a criticism made of counterterrorism laws more generally: guilty
of providing "too narrow a band of remedies focused on process.""5
But the narrow focus on process under outlawry law is appropriate given
the judiciary's characteristically modest role in reviewing the other branches'
exercise of power when it comes to national security issues."6 After surveying
two centuries of case law, Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes
conclude that "the courts have developed a process-based, institutionally-
oriented (as opposed to rights oriented) framework for examining the legality
156. See infra Section IV.B.
157. See infra Subsection V.B. 3 .
i8. See infra Section IV.B.
159. Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts, no COLUM. L. REV. 579,
635 (2010).
160. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 1, 7 (2004).
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of governmental action in extreme security contexts."' They further
explained: "The American courts have neither endorsed unilateral executive
authority nor taken it as their role to define directly the substantive content of
rights in these contexts.116 2 Instead, the courts have focused on ensuring "that
the right institutional process supports the tradeoff between liberty and
security at issue.""'
This view lays the bricks for interpreting the judiciary's narrow process
focus as outlawry's great strength. Outlawry posits that in the targeting
context, the right institutional process for striking a balance between liberty
and security is one that resists either being hostage to the suspect's
unwillingness to participate, or giving in to the Executive's claim to unilateral
power. The right process turns instead on the conditional authorization of
lethal force from all three branches of government. From an institution-
oriented perspective, outlawry principles derive their primary value not from
the substance of the protections afforded the prospective target, but from the
trilateral institutional endorsement required for a legitimate targeted killing.
B. Outlawry Brings Targeted Killing in Line with Other Government
Counterterrorism Operations Subject to Limited Judicial Review
How is it that judicial approval is required when the United States decides to
target a U.S. citizen overseas for electronic surveillance, but that . . .judicial
scrutiny is prohibited when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen
overseas for death ?,6,
When understood as one piece in a multifaceted counterterrorism strategy,
unilateral executive killing power is not a mere anomaly. It is incompatible
with the existing regime of limited judicial review of the government's
counterterrorism activities. 6 s In this Section, I examine judicial review in the
context of wiretapping and detainment to show that outlawry appropriately
161. Id. at 6.
162. Id. at 44.
163. Id. at 44-45.
164. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2010).
165. The existing regime is itself far from perfect, and a critique of it goes beyond the scope of
this Note. However, it is worth noting the interrelated effects of the government's various
counterterrorism policies. Illegalizing indefinite detainment, for example, would strengthen
an outlawry-based targeted killing scherna by making surrender a more viable option for the
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offers prospective targets of lethal force more robust protection.
Like judicial review in the context of secret surveillance, execution upon
outlawry requires that a court issue authorization ex ante, and further, only
upon the individual's failure to submit to the legal process. But like judicial
review in the context of detention, outlawry proceedings are adversarial and
present the individual the opportunity to refute the charges against him in court.
1. Judicial Review in the Context of Wiretapping
Judicial review of secret government surveillance requests takes place ex
ante and ex parte. To intercept the communications of a citizen or permanent
resident abroad, the government must submit an application for a surveillance
warrant before a judge of the secret court established by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). ' The FISA court grants the application if
there is probable cause to believe that one of the parties to the communication
in question is a foreign power or agent thereof, and that the targeted location
of surveillance is to be used by the foreign power or an agent of the foreign
power.167 The Attorney General may authorize a wiretap in an emergency
without obtaining authorization from the court, provided he submits an
application within seven days.
The FISA court approves the vast majority of applications it receives,169
which has yielded two opposing interpretations of the robustness of the
process. 7 o On the one hand, it has been argued that the court acts as a rubber
stamp on the Executive's requests for intrusive surveillance warrants."'7 On the
other hand, it may be that a rigorous process of internal executive review ensures
that a carefully winnowed crop of well-founded requests reaches the court."7
166. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Star. 1783.
Congress amended FISA after warrantless wiretapping conducted by the National Security
Agency caused public outcry in 2005. FISA Amendments Act of 20o8, Pub. L. No. 110-261,
122 Stat. 2436 (codified in scattered sections of5o U.S.C.A. (2008)).
167. FISA § 105(a) (codified at 50 U.S.C. 5 isos(a) (2006)).
168. 50 U.S.C.A. § isos(e).
169. The court approved each of the 1,506 electronic surveillance requests submitted by the DOJ
in 201o. Letter from Ronald Weich, U.S. Assistant Attorney Gen., to Harry Reid, Senate
Majority Leader (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2oorept.pdf.
170. Note, Shifting the FISA Paradigm: Protecting Civil Liberties by Eliminating Ex Ante Judicial
Approval, 121 HARV. L. REV. 2200, 2206 (2008).
171. See David G. Savage & Henry Weinstein, Court Widens Wiretapping in Terror Cases, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2002, http://articles.latimes.con/2oo2/nov/19/nation/na-wiretapig.
172. See Editorial, The Power To Kill, supra note 57 ("[T]he FISA court works with great speed
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In either case, a statute that forces the government to move for a judgment
of outlawry would allow for a more rigorous form of judicial review than
would ex parte FISA proceedings. Such a system would not only place the
courts in a position to authorize the outlawry and execution of a fugitive
terrorist, but also offer the courts a list of objective parameters for assessing
whether the accused has been afforded a meaningful opportunity to respond to
the government's charges.
2. Judicial Review in the Context ofDetainment
A counterintuitive consequence of the current lack of judicial check on the
government's targeted killing strategy is that the government can kill any
alleged terrorist with impunity, citizenship notwithstanding, but is restricted in
its ability to detain him. Perversely, as long as premeditated lethal force has no
legal consequences, while detainment poses legal complications, the
government has an incentive to treat the elimination of suspected terrorists as
the less messy alternative. 73 The government has issued statements that
suggest a policy of heightened caution about the use of lethal force against
citizens, but that caution is entirely at the President's discretion and hardly
reassuring to the misidentified target.
By requiring formal charges and judicial authorization before the
government may kill a target, outlawry offers to repair the perverse asymmetry
between reviewable detention and unreviewable use of lethal force. Outlawry
notably also provides ex ante protections, which preclude the problems that
stem from attempts to model targeted killing procedures too closely upon ex
post judicial review of detention decisions. 74
C. Outlawry Provides Coherent Principles for Legitimating and
Limiting the Government's Use ofLethal Force
Can a U.S. citizen - himselfor through another - use the U.S. judicial system
to vindicate his constitutional rights while simultaneously evading U.S. law
enforcement authorities, calling for 'jihad against the West," and engaging in
operational planning for an organization that has already carried out
and rarely rejects a warrant request, partly because the executive branch knows the rules and
does not present frivolous or badly argued cases.").
173. See Becker & Shane, supra note 19 ("[T] he administration's very success at killing terrorism
suspects has been shadowed by a suspicion: that Mr. Obama has avoided the complications
of detention by deciding, in effect, to take no prisoners alive.").
174. See supra Subsection I.B.i.
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numerous terrorist attacks against the United States?"s
Striking a balance between process and punishment, outlawry guarantees
prospective targets important protections without categorically eliminating any
of the government's options for dealing with suspected terrorists who refuse to
acknowledge their own legal sovereign. Outlawry should thus appeal to those
who have argued the fundamental injustice of banning the use of lethal force
against terrorist leaders. Such a ban selectively grants terrorists the very
procedural protections that are denied as a matter of course to their law-
abiding, uniformed counterparts on the battlefield, who are unequivocally
legitimate targets under the laws of war. '7 It thus amounts to "rewarding"
terrorists who resort to hiding among civilian populations and who in other
ways defy domestic and international laws.177
Outlawry offers a disciplined means of dismantling this distorted incentive
structure. The accused citizen-terrorist must choose between submitting to the
legal process and flouting it. The terrorist-in-hiding who has chosen to flout
the law is subject to the same lethal consequences of donning an enemy
uniform on a battlefield. 178
Yet outlawry's use need not facilitate the unbridled expansion of
government power. In this sense, an outlawry-based approach to targeting
policy contrasts sharply with the government's piecemeal and unrestrained
approach to justifying its killing program. For instance, in a recent speech,
John Brennan, the President's top counterterrorism adviser, cited the
nontraditional nature of the war against Al Qaeda -as manifested, for example,
in the fact that terrorists avoid uniform -as justification for the government's
175. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2010).
176. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Admiral Yamamoto and the Justification of Targeted Killing, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (May 13, 2011, 6:16 PM), http://volokh.con/2011/o5/13/admiral-yamamoto
-and-the-justification-of-targeted-killing ("If it is moral and legal to individually target
uniformed enemy military officers, surely the same goes for leaders of terrorist
organizations. It cannot be the case that law and morality give the latter greater protection
than the former.").
177. See Alston Report, supra note io, 6o (acknowledging the difficulty of defining "direct
participation" in hostilities in such a way that protects civilians but does not reward an
enemy hiding among civilians); see also Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of
Self-Defense (A Call To Amend Article 5r of the United Nations Charter), lo Hous. J. INT'L L. 25,
26 (1987) (observing that terrorists often engage in acts forbidden by the laws that govern in
wartime).
178. In law enforcement terms, interpreting the suspect's flight as a constructive waiver of his
trial rights prevents him from escaping the consequences of a guilty verdict while waging
violence against the state. See infra Section TV.B.
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adoption of an expansive definition of "imminence" to assess terror threats. 79
But Brennan made no mention of the other side of the coin: the difficulties
associated with correctly identifying a terrorist who has avoided the
conventional markers of combatant activity, and whether the United States
must take extra precautions to ensure that its attacks are directed strictly at
hostile forces.so
Outlawry, meanwhile, is a dual-use framework that not only permits but
just as importantly restricts the Executive's use of lethal force against its
citizens."' The resulting balance between process and punishment is key to
outlawry's constitutionality, as the next Part explains.
179. John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism,
Prepared Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: The
Ethics and Efficacy of the President's Counterterrorism Strategy (Apr. 30, 2012)
(transcript available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us
-counterterrorism-strategy).
180. For a brief discussion of the purpose of distinction (to protect civilians), see Laurie R. Blank,
After "Top Gun": How Drone Strikes Impact the Law of War, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 675, 689-94
(2012). Blank explains that "[i]dentifying who or what can be targeted is one of the most
fundamental issues during conflict." Id. at 689. For a discussion of how Brennan's expansive
definitions of imminent threat and proportional response undermine their usefulness in
constraining executive power, see Amos Guiora & Laurie Blank, Targeted Killing's 'Flexibility'
Doctrine that Enables US To Flout the Law of War, GUARDiAN (London), Aug. 10, 2012,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2oi2/aug/io/targeted-killing-flexibility-doctrine
-flout-law-war. See also Press Release, Professor Philip Alston, Statement of U.N. Special
Rapporteur on U.S. Targeted Killings Without Due Process, ACLU (Aug. 3, 2010),
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/statement-un-special-rapporteur-us-targeted-killings
-without-due-process (condemning the United States's "expansive and open-ended
interpretation of the right to self-defence").
181. This restrictive quality, among other things, distinguishes outlawry from recurring proposals
for the "citizenship-stripping" of prospective American targets. See, e.g., Greg Sargent, Here's
How Joe Lieberman's Citizenship-Stripping Bill Would Work, WASH. PosT (May 5,
2010, 11:52 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/plum-line/2oo/os/how liebermans
citizen-strippi.html. The Supreme Court ruled in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), that
Congress cannot expatriate a citizen on the grounds that certain acts created a presumption
that he intended to relinquish his citizenship. But outlawry is not the same as expatriation
and infers waiver only if myriad procedural standards to ensure clear intent have been met.
Citizenship stripping, meanwhile, not only does nothing to overcome the due process
problems posed by the government's targeting program, it also does great harm by
perpetuating the myth that citizenship alone poses a constraint on the President's killing
powers. See Section V.C.
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MODERN-DAY OUTLAWRY
I have shown that outlawry enjoyed extensive use on both sides of the
Atlantic and have offered practical arguments for resurrecting outlawry in the
targeting context. But according to Professor Juan Cole, "The problem with
declaring al-'Awlaqi an 'outlaw' by virtue of being a traitor or a terrorist is that
this whole idea was abolished by the US constitution.""' This Part focuses on
establishing the opposite: judicial outlawry is not inherently inconsistent with
the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
Since outlawry entails punishment as well as process, here I examine
concerns about whether outlawry would violate the Fifth and Eighth
Amendments. The fact that this punishment would be imposed on named
individuals without a trial, in turn, would appear to raise questions about
whether outlawry violates prohibitions on attainder.
A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The outlawry and execution of a narrowly defined category of terrorists
would not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. This position finds
support in the general principles guiding the Supreme Court's assessments of
Eighth Amendment claims, as well as in existing precedent governing the use
of lethal force against fleeing felons in the United States.
The Court's past approach to determining whether capital punishment
violates the Eighth Amendment provides a helpful framework for analyzing the
constitutionality of outlawry. In its 1976 decision in Gregg v. Georgia,' the
Court looked to history and precedent to determine that capital punishment for
murder was not a per se violation of the constitutional prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment.'18 The Gregg Court noted that the death penalty endured
in cases of murder both at English common law and in the individual states.
Capital punishment persisted even as the rules governing its imposition-
much like those governing outlawry in criminal proceedings -became
increasingly restricted, first due to the ever-narrowing category of murders
punishable by death, and then through the adoption of laws allowing juries the
discretion to grant mercy.'18 This historical evidence formed part of the basis
for the Court's decision to uphold capital punishment.
182. Cole, supra note 51.
183. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
184. Id. at 176.
185. Id. at 176-77.
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Similarly, the use of outlawry in states such as Pennsylvania in the late
eighteenth century suggests that outlawry enjoyed acceptance as a practicable
legal sanction around the time of the Constitution's drafting. Other evidence
supports this observation. In a private letter written in 1794, Alexander
Hamilton advocated for an outlawry bill and treason prosecutions in response
to the violent Pennsylvanian protest of the federal excise tax during the
Whiskey Rebellion. He reasoned, "A law regulating a peace process of outlawry
is also urgent; for the best objects of punishment will fly, and they ought to be
compelled by outlawry to abandon their property, homes, and the United
States."' 86 The Federalists eventually instead supported a military response to
quell the rebellion.' 8  Two years later, in 1796, a bill to regulate proceedings in
cases of outlawry reached the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives. 8 8
Further, although outlawry per se has been largely dormant in most of the
United States over the last century, numerous federal courts have determined
that a common law rule authorizing the use of deadly force against a fleeing
felon does not violate the Eighth Amendment.!" Arrest, not execution, was the
objective in these cases. However, the courts' tradition of upholding the
constitutionality of the resort to lethal force at least begins to suggest that
similar force might be acceptable under narrow circumstances in the
counterterrorism context.
The principle of proportionality has figured prominently in the Supreme
Court's approach to determining whether a punishment accords with the
Eighth Amendment.' 9o At base, the punishment must not be excessive in either
of two respects: it must not involve "unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain," and it must not be grossly disproportionate to the crime.
186. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Rufus King (Oct. 30, 1794), reprinted in to THE WORs
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 77 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904).
187. CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL
TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 184 (20o8).
188. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 271 (Jan. 28,1796).
189. See Mattis v. Schnarr, 404 F. Supp. 643, 650 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (observing that thirty-four
states authorized the use of deadly force to effectuate the arrest of a fleeing felon), rev'd on
other grounds, 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated sub nom. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171
(1977); Cunningham v. Ellington, 323 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (W.D. Tenn. 1971) (holding that
an officer's use of necessary means, including deadly force, to effect the arrest of a defendant
in flight was not punishment under the Eighth Amendment). See generally James 0.
Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Modern Status: Right of Peace Officer To Use Deadly Force in
Attempting To Arrest Fleeing Felon, 83 A.L.R.3d 174 (1978) (listing cases that support the
broad rule that officers may use deadly force where necessary to effect the arrest of a felon).
igo. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175-76.
191. Id. at 173.
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The outlawry and execution of fugitives who flee legal responsibility for the
death of innocent civilians need not be excessive in either sense. Historically,
the risk of authorizing use of force disproportionate to the underlying crime
has been a major source of the courts' concerns about the propriety of using
lethal force to effectuate arrests, especially in light of the growing number of
lower-grade felonies created by legislation over time.' 92 But execution upon
outlawry need not implicate concerns of proportionality if drone strikes are
properly restricted to a particular category of accused terrorists.'93 Modern-day
protocol for reversal of outlawry would also mitigate concerns about the
severity of the judgment.194
Of course, historical evidence and precedent can only go so far in
establishing that a particular practice accords with the Eighth Amendment.
After all, the question of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment "is
not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice."' Significantly, however, outlawry
has proven capable of evolving along with mores. Indeed, moral concerns
about outlawry appear to have often centered on practices either associated
with extrajudicial outlawry or easily excised from judicial outlawry
proceedings. For example, as discussed in Part I, in its earliest form a judgment
of outlawry permitted -indeed, obliged-every man to slay the outlaw upon
encountering him. But in the thirteenth century, this "barbaric justice" was
abolished in England, even as outlawry itself remained in force.'96 Further
supporting the proposition that private-citizen action need not be associated
with outlawry is evidence that the practice of allowing private citizens to
pursue fugitives actually outlived outlawry in the United States. At common
law, posse comitatus referred to the power of authorities to request assistance
192. See, e.g., Reneau v. State, 70 Tenn. 720, 721-22 (1879); see also Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d
132, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1975) (observing that the common law rule allowing an officer to kill a
person fleeing arrest for a felony evolved when only crimes involving force or violence,
punishable by death and forfeiture, were felonies); Beech v. Melancon, 465 F.2d 425, 426-27
(6th Cir. 1972) (McCree, J., concurring) (voicing constitutional concerns with any statute
permitting lethal force against the "fleeing income tax evader, antitrust law violator,
selective service delinquent, or other person whose arrest might be sought for the
commission of any one of a variety of other felonies of a type not normally involving danger
of death or serious bodily harm").
193. See infra Part V.
194. Sir Richards specifically cited reversibility of outlawry as a grounds for rejecting the
proposition that "to condemn any person without trial is contrary to the principles of
justice." Richards, supra note I, at 304.
195. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)).
196.2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 80, at 577.
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from citizens in pursuing a criminal, with the civilians in pursuit using such
force as deemed necessary to effectuate the arrest. 197 On the Western frontier,
use of this power was interpreted as an authorization for manhunts.9' A
regime that empowers only government agents to execute a legal outlaw would
preclude the public violence implicit in this kind of private-citizen action.
B. Due Process
Whether modern outlawry proceedings could meet constitutional due
process demands is a holistic inquiry, intertwined with many of the
considerations that are relevant to determining whether execution upon
outlawry constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.'99 But to begin the
analysis, it is worth noting that critics who allege that the government's
targeted killing policy violates the Constitution's due process guarantees have
not reached consensus on what protections would have sufficed in the case of
Anwar al-Awlaki. Some commentators have pointed out that Awlaki was not
provided formal notice or charged.2 oo Still others have focused on the
government's refusal to confirm the existence and contents of the CIA's kill list
and the targets' lack of opportunity to surrender.2 o' Many legal experts and ex-
military officers have argued that, as a general matter, terror suspects must be
afforded the same rights as ordinary criminal suspects in the form of a public
trial in a federal court, irrespective of citizenship.2 o2
Outlawry's legitimacy as a legal judgment is predicated on fulfilling the
first two sets of demands, for criminal proceedings and for the kind of notice
197. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at *344. For a discussion of the federal prohibition on posse
comitatus as a form of military enforcement of domestic law, see infra note 243.
198. PRASSEL, supra note 112, at 109.
199. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (declaring that regard for the
requirements of the Due Process Clause "inescapably imposes upon this Court an exercise of
judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings (resulting in a conviction] in order to
ascertain whether they offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the
notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most
heinous offenses" (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1945))).
zoo. See, e.g., David Cole, Killing Our Citizens Without Trial, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 24, 2011,
http ://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/nov/24/killing-our-citizens-without-trial.
201. See, e.g., Dan Markel, Quintessentially American: Suing the Lethal Presidency, PRAWFSBLAWG
(July 18, 2012, 2:21 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/danmarkel.
202. See, e.g., Daphne Eviatar, 9/l Masterminds Could Face Trial in Federal Court, WASH. INDEP.
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that would allow the prospective target to submit to those proceedings.2 o3
However, outlawry law rejects the assumption built into the third demand-
that due process requires a full trial. Outlawry posits instead that at the heart of
due process lies the choice of trial. As the Supreme Court noted in 1894, it is
axiomatic under our jurisprudence that due process gives the affected parties
"an opportunity to be heard respecting the justice of the judgment sought."2 o4
And as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared in the case of Aaron Doan,
outlawry does not deprive the accused of this opportunity to be heard: given
adequate procedures for notice, the accused may claim his right to trial by
surrendering to the legal process."os
Modern practice confirms that the choice of trial, not trial itself, is the
essence of due process. Approximately ninety-five percent of felony convictions
in the United States are the consequence of individuals waiving their right to
trial in favor of a plea bargain.206 An effective waiver "is ordinarily an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right."2 o7 The modern
guilty plea meets this standard as an affirmative admission of wrongdoing and
an express waiver of trial rights.2os
Whether outlawry is consistent with due process, in contrast, turns on the
legitimacy of interpreting the suspected terrorist's failure to surrender as an
intentional waiver (or perhaps forfeiture) of his trial rights.209 Although
current Supreme Court jurisprudence militates against such an interpretation
in ordinary circumstances,2"0 it seems reasonable to suggest a more flexible
approach to waiver warrants consideration in the extraordinary
counterterrorism context. After all, "[i]t is waiver of rights that permits the
system of criminal justice to work at all."2 ' Extending this truism to citizens
203. See infra Section V.B.
204. Marchant v. Pa. R.R. Co., 153 U.S. 380, 387 (1894) (emphasis added) (quoting Hoger v.
Reclamation Dist., MII U.S. 701, 708 (1884)).
205. See supra Section II.B.
206. See Office of Justice Programs, Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 2ooo, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE 53 (2000), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cfjsoo.pdf.
207. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
2o8. Note, The Guilty Plea as a Waiver of "Present but Unknowable" Constitutional Rights: The
Aftermath ofthe Brady Trilogy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1435, 1436 (1974).
209. Flight and a guilty plea are also distinct in the sense that one is a gamble and the other a
bargain. The harsher sanction in the case of nonappearance is arguably the cost of attempted
flight.
210. Cf Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) ("[A]s the right of jury trial is
fundamental, courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.").
211. See Michael E. Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term-Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional
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who are accused of crimes so serious as to warrant their killing would allow the
criminal justice system to work in the targeting setting.
In the targeting setting, flight could be interpreted as a kind of constructive
waiver. The constructive waiver, whereby a criminal defendant may waive a
constitutional right by his conduct rather than by express request, arose out of
Illinois v. Allen,m' in which the Supreme Court ruled that a defendant could lose
the right to be present at his own trial through his disruptive behavior.' The
Allen Court's ruling was motivated in part by its rejection of the idea that "the
accused be permitted by his disruptive conduct indefinitely to avoid being tried
on the charges brought against him." 14 In Taylor v. United States,21s the Court
extended the theory of the constructive waiver by holding that a defendant had
effectively waived his right to be present at trial by fleeing from noncapital
charges after trial had commenced. In so ruling, the Court found it "wholly
incredible" that the defendant did not know the trial would continue in his
absence."'
The Court, on the other hand, has declined to permit trials to proceed
when the defendant is absent from the start, based on the heightened risk that
the defendant has not made a "knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to be
present."2 17 But one commentator has argued for eliminating the "talismanic
significance" ascribed to the commencement of trial."" The reasoning is
simple: "A defendant who is informed that his trial will be held at a certain
time and place and declines an invitation to participate would seem to have
little standing to complain."' This is the very logic implicit in the claim that
Awlaki should have been granted a full trial in absentia.
Outlawry takes this logic a step further. An alleged citizen-terrorist whose
status as an outlaw is well promulgated worldwide could be presumed to know
that his refusal to surrender to authorities would cost him the benefit of a trial.
Additionally, interpreting the outlaw's refusal to appear for trial as a
constructive waiver of his right to trial accords with the logic of Allen and
Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1970).
212. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
213. For an extended discussion of various types of waiver and inconsistencies in the Court's
approach to analyzing the voluntariness underlying waivers, see Tigar, supra note 211, at 7-25.
214. Allen, 397 U.S. at 346.
215. 414 U.S. 17 (1973)-
216. Id. at 20.
217. Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 261-62 (1993).
218. Starkey, supra note So, at 721, 742-43.
219. Id. at 742.
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Taylor in that it prevents the putative defendant from indefinitely escaping the
sentence for which he would have been eligible under a guilty verdict. The
costs of indefinite escape are too high in the case of an alleged terrorist intent
on waging war against the state as a fugitive at large.
Importantly, the defendant's mere absence in response to a summons
would not be interpreted as a waiver of his due process rights. The waiver
would instead be predicated on the satisfaction of rigorous notice requirements
and other procedural precautions designed to secure corroboration of the
intent to waive.o
C. Attainder
A last possible objection to the constitutionality of outlawry requires close
analysis of the meaning of the Article I Bill of Attainder Clause... and the
Article III Attainder of Treason Clause.m' Although attainder was once the
immediate effect of a judgment of outlawry, so too was attainder the
"inseparable consequence" of a death sentence.' Yet capital punishment has
remained alive and well in the United States without implicating attainder. If
resurrected, outlawry promises the same.
For most of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court defined an Article I
bill of attainder as a law that (i) imposes punishment (2) on specific individuals
(3) without a judicial trial." In recent years, litigants have made expansive use
of the prohibition-to bring habeas petitions, to invalidate regulatory schemes,
and to challenge a state constitutional amendment banning same-sex
marriage.' Most recently, death warrants issued by the Executive have been
described as bills of attainder.=6 On July 18, 2012, the American Civil Liberties
22o. See infra Section V.B. For a brief discussion of how this distinguishes outlawry from a
system under which expatriation is justified through inferred waiver, see supra note 18l.
221. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, 5 9, cl. 3; see, e.g., LEANNE FIFTAL ALARID, COMMUNITY-BASED
CORRECTIONS 312 (9th ed. 2010) ("Outlawry as a form of punishment is not allowed in the
United States by virtue of Article I of the Constitution, which forbids'bills of attainder."').
222. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, Cl. 2.
223. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at *373.
224. See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 846-47 (1984)
(citing Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977)); United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946).
225. See Jacob Reynolds, The Rule of Law and the Origins of the Bill of Attainder Clause, 18 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 177, 177-78 (2005).
226. Alford, supra note 6o, at 1210; see also Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 452 n.5 (1956)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The guarantee of jury trial and the prohibition of Bills of
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Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights invoked the Article I provision
in their lawsuit for the wrongful deaths of Awlaki, Samir Khan, and Awlaki's
teenaged son. 27
But, broadly speaking, the Executive's current targeted killing policy does
not implicate bills of attainder. Article I is devoted to prescribing limits on
Congress's powers. Former Chief Justice William Rehnquist has described a
bill of attainder as a "precise legal term[]" that refers to "a legislative act that
singled out one or more persons and imposed punishment on them, without
benefit of trial."2 2 9
Irrespective of whether an Executive-issued death warrant constitutes a bill
of attainder, an outlawry statute decidedly does not. Bills of attainder were
repugnant to the Founders because they amounted to the legislature-or,
under the death warrant theory, the President- usurping the courts' role in
judging an individual's guilt and determining the appropriate punishment.2 30
A federal statute that permits the courts alone to issue a judgment of outlawry
and an execution sentence in any individual case would involve no such
usurpation."'
The Attainder of Treason Clause would seem more likely to pose problems
for court-issued outlawry proceedings where the terrorist act is categorized as a
crime of treason, since it is located in Article III, which lays out the scope of
judicial power. The provision states: "The Congress shall have power to
Attainder place beyond the pale the imposition of infamy or outlawry by either the
Executive or the Congress.").
227. Complaint at 16, Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 12-cV-01192 (D.D.C. July 18, 2012).
228. Cf Ryan Alford, Outlawry and Indeterminacy: Mere Formalistic Concerns?, CATO UNBOUND
(June 17, 2011, 2:21 PM), http://www.cato-unbound.org/2ol/o6/17/ryan-alford/outlawry
-and-indeterminacy-mere-formalistic-concerns ("Allowing the president to declare a citizen
an outlaw, who then effectively has no legal rights and can be killed on sight pursuant to the
president's order to do so, dispenses with the centuries of collected wisdom about due
process and the rule of law embodied in the U.S. Constitution." (emphasis added)).
229. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT IS 166 (1987)
(emphasis added). For example, a 2010 bill that Representative Charles Dent introduced in
the House to revoke Awlaki's citizenship represents an overtly problematic congressional
attempt to single out an individual for punishment in violation of the Bill of Attainder
Clause. H.R. Res. 1288, 111th Cong. (2010); see supra note 181.
230. REHNQUIST, supra note 229.
231. At the heart of even broad legal interpretations of the Bill of Attainder Clause is the
legislature's usurpation of the role of the courts in issuing judgments, a problem not posed
by a carefully crafted outlawry statute that reserves the judgment for the judiciary. See, e.g.,
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965) (rejecting an overly narrow definition of
the Bill of Attainder Clause but describing the Clause as "a general safeguard against ...
trial by legislature" (emphasis added)).
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declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work
corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the life of the person
attainted." But as emphasized by Edward Everett in 1864, the Article III
provision merely prohibits the effect of an attainder of treason.' For instance,
the "essence of attainder" was the corruption of the blood, which punished the
felon's innocent relatives into perpetuity.2 " Establishing varied forms of
punishment for treason, meanwhile, was well within the legislature's powers.
Everett observed, "Congress may impose the penalty of fine, or imprisonment,
or outlawry, or banishment, or forfeiture, or death, or of death and forfeiture
of property, personal and real."234
V. UPDATING OUTLAWRY
As discussed in the previous Part, nothing in the Constitution precludes the
modern resurrection of outlawry so long as the punitive qualities of the practice
are properly balanced with process. This Part uses the theoretical principles
underlying outlawry to hammer out specific conditions that must be met for
outlawry proceedings to serve as a legitimate check on the Executive's use of
lethal force. It then discusses how the practice of outlawry could be adjusted to
meet certain legal and practical concerns important to its modern viability.
A. An Approach to Procedural Sufficiency
History makes clear that the outlawry proceedings are not fair and effective
simply by virtue of involving the courts. The proceedings must be designed to
punish the fugitive in flight only after satisfactory efforts have been made to
compel his appearance. Failure to put this tenet into practice would undermine
the legitimacy of a modern outlawry regime.
Outlawry law in North Carolina featured significant departures from these
common law ideals and offers a helpful sketch of the deficiencies that modern
outlawry must avoid. In 1976, a federal district court held that North
Carolina's outlawry statute was unconstitutional because it was procedurally
deficient under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in four
respects.' First, it did not require a probable cause determination by a neutral
232. 9 FRANK MOORE, THE REBELLION RECORD: A DIARY OF AMERICAN EVENTS, SUPPLEMENT 712
(New York, G.P. Putnam 1868).
233. Id. at 712-13.
234. Id.
235. Autry v. Mitchell, 42o F. Supp. 967, 970 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
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judicial officer."' Second, the statute did not require an arrest warrant or grand
jury indictment.3 Third, the statute did not require an arrest warrant or other
process to be served and returned, showing that the accused was not to be
found within the jurisdiction.2" Finally, the outlawry proclamation was issued
ex parte and did not require notice and an opportunity for the fleeing felon to
be heard. 9
In short, the court enumerated flaws not fatal to outlawry as a legal
instrument. In fact, the legitimacy of outlawry at various points in English
history and in early Pennsylvania was predicated on protections designed to
preclude the very defects that the district court identified. A state legislature
intent on preserving outlawry presumably could have tailored the statute to
require a probable cause determination, an arrest warrant or indictment, good
faith attempts at serving the warrant or indictment, and adequate safeguards
designed to ensure notice to the prospective outlaw.
The rest of this Part travels the road not taken by the 1976 North Carolina
state legislature. It borrows principles of outlawry from English common law
to craft conditions under which alleged citizen-terrorists who refuse to
surrender to criminal prosecution may be targeted for death. Again, as
emphasized in the previous Part, outlawry proves as restrictive a theoretical
framework as it is justificatory. The schema described below avoids the
procedural pitfalls of North Carolina's outlawry statute, which was subject to
repeated challenge in the 1970s for reasons related to probable cause, notice,
cruel and unusual punishment, and arbitrary application.4
B. Necessary Conditions for Lawful Modern Outlawry
1. Congressional Authorization
Congress must pass a law to authorize the use of lethal force against terror
suspects deemed outlaws. The statute could spell out the processes by which a
court may issue a judgment of outlawry, or leave the specifics of their





24o. This is the Law: Outlaws.. . , supra note 132.
241. The Posse Comitatus Act, ch. 263, 20 Stat. 152 (1878) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (20o6)),
prohibits military personnel from being used to enforce domestic law on American soil. But
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court specially designated to carry out outlawry proceedings. The relative
infrequency with which the government expects to outlaw and execute
Americans could also make it more efficient to relegate the proceedings to the
D.C. courts.
The legitimacy of a modern outlawry statute would turn in part on how
narrowly outlawry-eligible crimes are defined. Recall that at common law, an
outlaw could be executed upon a judgment of outlawry on the theory that the
outlawry in criminal proceedings amounted to a conviction for the underlying
crime." A modern statute must require that a fleeing felon be outlawed only
for clearly defined capital crimes. Further, modern outlawry would ideally be
reserved for alleged terrorists charged with serious and specific crimes against
the United States. In eighteenth-century New York, for instance, outlawry was
eventually abolished except for use against fugitives indicted for or convicted of
treason." A similar guiding principle would help establish outlawry as an
exceptional weapon of last resort.
Like any other category of crime, terrorist acts can be differentiated
according to their capital nature; they need not be hazy and ill-defined. For
example, under the federal statute 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, which concerns the
provision of material support to terrorists, the maximum penalty is fifteen
years in prison unless the activity has resulted in a death.4 On the other hand,
the definition of enemy combatant offered by the Combatant Status Review
Tribunal under the George W. Bush Administration features exactly the kind
of open-ended language that a statute laying out outlawry-eligible crimes must
avoid. 4
the prohibition does not apply where Congress grants such authority to a branch of the
armed forces, establishes general rules for certain types of military assistance, or creates
narrowly crafted legislation for particular circumstances. Even if the Act is inapplicable
outside the United States, supplemental provisions in io U.S.C. §§ 371-381 contain similar
prohibitions that likely apply worldwide. CHARLEs DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-
9 6 4 S, THE POSSE CoMITATus ACT AND RELATED MATTERS: THE USE OF THE MILITARY To
EXECUTE CIVILIAN LAW 46 (2000). In any case, Congress may expressly authorize military
involvement in enforcing domestic law. See, e.g., 1o U.S.C. § 375 (20o6).
242. See supra Section II.A.
243. See United States v. Hall, 198 F.2d 726, 728 n.2 (2d Cir. 1952).
244. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (20o6).
245. An enemy combatant is "an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or Al
Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States
or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or
has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces." Memorandum from
Deputy Sec'y of Def. (July 14, 20o6), http://www.defense.gov/news/Aug2006/
d20o6o8o9CSRTProcedures.pdf.
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2. Formal Charges
The Obama Administration never initiated prosecution against Awlaki for
terrorism. A judgment of outlawry, however, derives its legitimacy from the
fugitive's refusal to submit to formal charges.
Requiring the Executive to articulate the conduct that warrants a suspect's
status as a death-eligible target serves two important functions. First, it
provides the target with a clear statement of his alleged crimes, which he may
then choose to repudiate. Second, it keeps the public informed as to what kinds
of conduct warrant the targeting of a citizen -information to which every
citizen, as a potential target, is entitled.
The facts of the Awlaki case demonstrate the advantages of restricting the
use of lethal force to those whose crimes the government is able to articulate
and whose ties to designated terrorist groups are well defined. Awlaki used
technology to agitate for war. But the question that lingers in the wake of his
death is whether and which of his activities made him a legitimate target of
lethal force. The Obama Administration claims that Awlaki was an external
operations leader who, among other things, directed the 2009 Christmas Day
plot to blow up a plane bound for Detroit.' But by some reports, Awlaki was
merely the confirmed voice and radicalizing force behind an enormous body of
work that includes calls for terrorism against the United States.14 7 Some
scholars have pointed to the lack of available evidence establishing that Awlaki
was more than an influential recruiter and motivational force for Al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula."5 Still others have questioned Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula's status as an Al Qaeda "co-belligerent," and whether force against
Awlaki was accordingly authorized under the Authorization for Use of Military
Force.249
As a practical matter, the government should be able to charge alleged
246. Carol J. Williams, Awlaki Death Rekindles Legal Debate on Targeting Americans, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2ol/sep/3o/world/la-fg-awlaki-due
-process-20111001. In 2010, one official described Awlaki as more dangerous than Osama
bin Laden. See Matthew Cole & Aaron Katersky, Awlaki: 'The Most Dangerous Man in the
World,' ABC NEWS (Nov. 10, 2010), http://abcnews.go.conVBlotter/awlaki-dangerous-man
-world/story?id=12109217.
247. J.M. Berger, Gone but Not Forgotten, FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept. 30, 2011, http://www
.foreignpolicy.conVarticles/2o1/o9/3o/AnwaralAwlaki deadbutnot-forgotten.
248. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Obama's Death Panel, FOREIGN POL'Y, Oct. 7, 2011,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/artiles/2on/1o/o7/obamas-deathpanel ("Nobody suggests
that Awlaki was one of al Qaeda's leading military strategists. His real weapon was his
impassioned anti-American sermons . . . ").
249. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). See Cole, supra note 200.
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terrorists without presenting sensitive intelligence to a civilian grand jury.2 so
To file any charges that could lead to the outlawing of the suspect, the
government should be forced to meet the standard required of a grand jury
indictment - a preponderance of the evidence - before a judge in camera. Here
it might be useful to consider the process by which the State Department
presently makes formal foreign terrorist organization (FTO) designations.
After identifying a prospective FTO, the Bureau of Counterterrorism compiles
an administrative record that includes classified information establishing that
the statutory requirements for the designation have been satisfied.2' In
outlawry proceedings, such a record would be subject to judicial review.
To avoid being outlawed, the accused could be given a deadline by which
to respond to the charges, instead of being granted successive opportunities to
appear as part of an elaborate exacting process. Once outlawed, he could then
be given a window within which to appeal. For example, by law, an FTO may
seek judicial review of its designation in the United States Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit within thirty days of the decision's publication in the Federal
Register.' Similarly, an outlaw could be granted a brief grace period, during
which time he is safe from targeting and may surrender unharmed.
3. Notice
A secret hit list has no legitimacy under outlawry principles. Notice is
essential to due process, and has been, throughout history, critical to
outlawry's fair function as a criminal conviction.253
Notice is the obvious counterpart to formal charges, which lose purpose if
not communicated to the target and the public. The release of the names of
citizens on the government's target list not only offers the option of surrender
250. See, e.g., Amanda Schaffer, Comment, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Terrorists: An In-Depth
Analysis of the Government's Right To Classify United States Citizens Suspected of Terrorism as
Enemy Combatants and Tty Those Enemy Combatants by Military Commission, 3o FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1465, 1475-76 (2003). Indictments are not considered essential to due process. In
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), the Supreme Court held that a state's use of an
information instead of a grand jury indictment did not constitute a denial of due process of
law, with explicit reference to the use of informations at common law. Id. at 538.
251. Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP'T OF ST. (Sept. 28,
2012), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/12308s.htm. The Secretary of State makes the
designation and gives Congress seven days to block it. Id. In contrast, only a court would be
able to "designate" an individual an outlaw.
252. Id.
253. See supra Section II.A.
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to the accused before and after they are outlawed,s 4 but also informs those
who interact with the target that they risk becoming collateral damage. In the
face of a secret killing regime, on the other hand, the public is left to hope that
the name of a prospective target will be leaked to the press.ss
In his dissent in Hamdi, Justice Thomas dismissed the notion that the
government need give terrorists notice and an opportunity to respond
before bombing them abroad. He is not alone.256 Such a requisite is easily
caricatured, as in the following statement: "The CIA, before firing a missile,
need not and should not invite Osama bin Laden or his lawyer to a hearing to
contest whether he is, in fact, a committed member of Al Qaeda." 2s7 But I
challenge this position. Offering an alleged terrorist notice every time the
government plans a strike against him would of course be self-defeating. But it
is far from absurd to demand that the government issue notice of a citizen's
prospective and successful addition to a kill list.
Government leaks revealed Awlaki had been added to the CIA's kill list
almost two years before he was successfully targeted.s' I recognize that the
government may nonetheless protest the formal release of target names as a
compromise of covert operations. But this Note has taken the position that the
government's refusal to identify Americans it intends to kill is an unequivocal
violation of due process, a fact unchanged by the government's compelling
strategic justifications for that denial.
In the age of the Internet, the logistics of providing notice should present
few insurmountable hurdles even when the fugitive's whereabouts are
unknown. At minimum, like organizations designated as FTOs, the names of
citizens facing outlawry and, subsequently, execution should be published on a
central government database, at which point global media outlets could be
expected to spread the news far and wide. More creative avenues could also be
worth pursuing. As Awlaki demonstrated in YouTube video after YouTube
254. See supra Subsection I.B.3.
255. Such leaks are often the confusing product of officials speaking on condition of anonymity.
See, e.g., Dana Priest, U.S. Military Teams, Intelligence Deeply Involved in Aiding
Yemen on Strikes, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.conVwp-dyn
/content/article/20io/ol/26/AR2o o12604239.html (reporting that an anonymous
intelligence official had stated that Awlaki was among three U.S. citizens on the CIA's kill-
or-capture list-a statement that the source later retracted as a misunderstanding, according
to a correction appended to the article).
256. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 597 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
257. Murphy & Radsan, supra note 30, at 446.
258. Priest, supra note 255.
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video,259 technology can be used to incite terrorism with unprecedented
efficiency. The time is ripe to explore technology's uses as another kind of
conduit-a conduit for legal notice in the extraordinary counterterrorism
context.
4. Reversal of Outlawry upon Surrender
As Judge Bates recognized in his decision, international and domestic law
would have barred the U.S. government from authorizing Awlaki's killing had
he peacefully surrendered himself to a U.S. embassy.2"o In this respect,
outlawry principles reflect the sensibilities of modern jurisprudence. Because
lethal force is warranted specifically when the outlaw rejects the legal system,
outlawry principles demand restoration of the appropriate protections to the
target who returns within the parameters of that system.26
A process that allows the terrorist to surrender and reclaim the right to trial
ensures that trial rights are revoked only when necessary. As discussed in
Section II.A, since at least the time of Edward VI, an outlaw could seek reversal
if he submitted himself to the legal process within a year of the judgment. As
described in Section II.B, outlawry was issued against the Doans in early
Pennsylvania specifically while they terrorized the countryside. When the
threat abates and the terrorist avails himself of the law, so abates the
justification for use of lethal force.
Outlawry principles alone cannot resolve the practical problems that might
hinder a suspect from communicating his intention to surrender. And it is not
clear that the government is obliged to devote resources grossly
disproportionate to the likelihood that the surrender option would be exercised
in order to resolve all of these issues. But certain steps must be taken to craft
sensible surrender protocol and avoid reducing the option of reversal to a
sham. To start, after a court declares an American an outlaw, the government
could issue a brief list of avenues of surrender and the procedures by which the
fugitive could assert each option. Consider Judge Bates's suggestion that
Awlaki could surrender himself to the embassy in Sana'a, a seemingly simple
option complicated by the fact that hundreds of miles separate Sana'a from the
259. YouTube Removes Video Sermons by al-Awlaki, CBS NEWS (Nov. 4, 2010, 11:28 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/21oo-2o5_162-7021533.html.
260. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2010).
261. The Obama Administration has conceded the importance of ensuring that its use of lethal
force conforms to the principle of necessity as required by the law of war. Brennan, supra
note 179.
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mountains where Awlaki was thought to be hiding.26' For its part, the
government could have prescribed that Awlaki send a message declaring his
intent to surrender in advance of his arrival at the consulate and conferred with
the consulate to ensure protocols were in place both for receiving Awlaki into
custody and protecting itself against duplicity.
C. Additional Considerations and Restrictions
Even with protocol for protections such as notice and surrender firmly in
place, resurrecting outlawry raises concerns about opening the door to its
overuse and arbitrary application. In particular, the government's already-
strident targeting of noncitizen-terrorists prompts two critical questions. First,
could outlawry be abused to authorize the execution of large numbers of
Americans? Second, why not extend the judicial protections offered by
outlawry to noncitizen targets? The answers are related. Simply put, the
government must be limited to employing outlawry strictly to fight terrorism
abroad. This restriction in turn complicates the attempt to extend outlawry to
noncitizens.
With respect to using outlawry to declare large numbers of citizens "death-
eligible," a number of checks already exist or could be specially implemented to
restrict the practice. Importantly, international humanitarian law and
international human rights law already restrict a state's ability to conduct a
targeted killing in the territory of another state with which it is not in armed
conflict."' To conduct drone strikes in foreign territory, the United States has
relied heavily on its right to exercise self-defense, as provided under Article 51
262. Alford, supra note 6o, at 1255-57. Alford argues that Judge Bates made two other problematic
assumptions in addition to presupposing that Awlaki had the notice necessary to challenge
his own status as a target: first, that the government would act in accordance with the
Constitution after having decided Awlaki was not protected by it; and second, that Alwaki
had access to the kind of technology that would enable him to make contact with counsel
while hiding in the mountains. See id.
263. Alston Report, supra note io, 51 34-35; see also Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual
Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense,
126 MIL. L. REv. 89, lo6 (1989) (describing territorial sovereignty as a major legal constraint
on taking actions against terrorists in foreign countries, but explaining that the national
defense may require breach where states fail their obligation to control terrorist activities
taking place within their borders). In Pakistan, however, the U.S. government is reportedly
operating under the curious assumption that it has tacit consent to conduct its drone strikes,
despite the country's public opposition to the program. Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman &
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of the United Nations Charter, 64 but the government would be unable to
deploy this reasoning to outlaw and execute an American accused of a capital
offense unrelated to terrorist activity.265
Additionally, a statutory provision that prohibits the government from
outlawing Americans or executing Americans already declared outlaws on
American soil would be consistent with basic principles of law enforcement.
Use of lethal force is not presumptively unconstitutional in the domestic law-
enforcement context,6 6 -as discussed in Part II, it has been condoned when
necessary to effect the arrest of fleeing felons. But such use must not be
premeditated, 6 7 which eliminates the possibility of domestic outlawry.
Moreover, capture would not be strategically infeasible inside the United States
in the way it is among hostile forces in foreign territory. Rather than
functioning as a last resort, the use of outlawry within the United States would
amount to bypassing our wholly adequate criminal justice system2
Finally, this Note does not mean to suggest that citizens alone have a right
to due process before being placed on the government's kill list. 6' For over a
century, the Supreme Court has upheld the idea that foreign nationals living
within American borders are "persons" within the meaning of the Constitution
and afforded those rights that the Constitution does not expressly reserve for
264. The George W. Bush Administration relied on the influential Parks Memorandum to invoke
this reasoning and justify targeting individuals who posed a direct threat to American
citizens in peacetime. BLUM & HEYMANN, supra note 21, at 78. In 2010, State Department
Legal Advisor Harold Koh appeared to use similar reasoning to defend the Obaia
Administration's drone strikes, declaring that a state involved in either "armed conflict or
legitimate self-defense" need not provide citizen-targets legal process before using lethal
force against them. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Keynote
Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010)
(transcript available at http://www.state.gov/s/1/releases/remarks/13919.htm). But see
Michael Lewis, Why IHL and Not Self-Defense Should Be Considered the Legal Basis for the
Awlaki Operation, IAwFARE (Sept. 30, 2011, 3:41 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2on
/09/guest-post-from-mike-lewis-on-awlaki-and-neutrality-law.
265. It is well accepted that the inherent right to self-defense is restricted to what is necessary and
proportionate to repel an attack. Baker, supra note 177, at 33-34.
266. Dehn & Heller, supra note 17, at 176 (Dehn, Opening Statement).
267. MELZER, supra note 22, at 423.
268. For a discussion of the government's obligation to exercise due diligence in apprehending a
suspect fleeing prosecution, see Bruce A. Green, "Hare and Hounds": The Fugitive Defendant's
Constitutional Right To Be Pursued, 56 BROOK. L. REV- 439 (1990).
269. The protections of the Due Process Clause are not limited to citizens: "No person shalt
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT.
amend. V.
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citizens.o27 But I discuss outlawry specifically as it applies to citizens since their
right to constitutional protections while outside the country's borders is much
more clearly established than that of noncitizens abroad and in flight. 71 Also, I
acknowledge that extending outlawry principles to noncitizens with no
allegiance to the United States would implicate theoretical concerns and legal
issues not discussed in this Note. Since outlawry is premised on the idea that
the lawlessness of those properly subject to a legal system may warrant casting
them outside of the system.
That said, selectively protecting Americans from the government's use of
lethal force has some troubling implications from a strategic perspective to say
nothing of the moral implications. Such an approach gives terrorist
organizations added incentive to recruit American followers, by some accounts
already an active Al Qaeda undertaking." A coherent counterterrorism
strategy would seem to favor establishing roughly equitable legal approaches to
incapacitating citizen- and noncitizen-terrorists.
CONCLUSION
In the case of Anwar al-Awlaki, the executive branch used lethal force
against an American citizen without initiating criminal prosecution ex ante or
disclosing its legal justifications ex post.273 The Obama Administration's
270. David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights as Citizens?, 25 T.
JEFFERSON L. REv. 367, 370 (2003). But the Supreme Court has also permitted foreign
nationals to be treated differently on account of race. Id. at 368-69.
271. See Jed Rubenfeld, The End ofPrivacy, 61 STAN. L. REv. 101, 151 (2008) ("Our Constitution
does not protect people outside this country in the way it protects people inside."); see also
Al-Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3 d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (borrowing a multi-factor analysis from
Boumediene that includes examination of the citizenship of the detainee, and effectively
finding that where the government apprehends an alien abroad and detains him within a
theater of war, habeas does not apply); People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of
State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (declaring that a foreign national "without property
or presence in this country has no constitutional rights, under the due process clause or
otherwise").
272. Robert Miniter, Was Obama Right To Kill Awlaki?, DAILY BEAST (Sept. 30, 2011,
4:10 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2oil/09/30/anwar-al-awlaki-and-why
-president-barack-obama-is-right-to-kill-u-s-citizens.html; see also Rick "Ozzie" Nelson &
Ben Bodurian, A Growing Terrorist Threat? Assessing "Homegrown" Terrorism in the United
States, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD. (Mar. 2010), http://www.csis.org
/files/publication/1oo3o4_NelsonGrowingTerroristThreat Web.pdf (describing five
incidents from 2009, including the recruitment of two dozen young Somali Americans to
fight for al-Shabaab, as part of a pattern of rising "homegrown" terrorism).
273. See Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case To Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
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interpretation of Awlaki's death as a legitimate military measure is disturbing
in that it suggests no limits on the Executive's authority to kill as it deems
appropriate in the "everywhere and forever war" 74 against terrorism.2 '75
But targeted killing advocates insist that the practice is indispensable to
defeating a "decentralized, free-scale terrorist network" like Al Qaeda.276 And
the institutionalization of targeted killings is well under way. 277
According to defense officials, Predator and Reaper drone missiles are as
commonplace as modern-day "cannon fire,""7 and the death toll indicates that
their use is not confined to high-value foreign targets. 9 By one estimate, as of
July 14, 2012, drone strikes ordered under the Obama Administration had killed
a total of between 1,507 and 2,438 people in Pakistan alone, including between
148 and 309 civilians.2
8
The stakes involved in the familiar tradeoff between security and liberty are
nowhere higher than in the realm of targeted killings. But this Note declines to
2011, http://www.nyimes.com/2o1o/o9/world/middleeasVsecret-us-memo-made-legal-case
-to-kill-a-citizen.html.
274. A Call to Courage: Reclaiming Our Liberties Ten Years After 9/11, ACLU 9 (Sept. 2011),
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/acalltocourage.pdf
275. White House officials speaking on condition of anonymity have acknowledged only that
Awlaki's citizenship required that the President grant special approval to Awlaki's placement
on the CIA's target list. Greg Miller, Muslim Cleric Aulaqi Is ist U.S. Citizen on List of Those
CIA Is Allowed To Kill, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp
-dyn/content/article/2olo/o4/o6/AR2o0oo4o6o4121.html.
276. See John Yoo, Assassination or Targeted Killings After 9/11, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 57, 63-69
(2011).
277. For example, the Obama Administration has reportedly constructed an advanced blueprint
called a "disposition matrix" to aid in the continued targeting of terrorists. Greg Miller, Plan
for Hunting Terrorists Signals U.S. Intends To Keep Adding Names to Kill Lists, WASH. POST,
Oct. 23, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/plan-for-hunting
-terrorists-signals-us-intends-to-keep-adding-names-to-kill-lists/2012/1o/23/4789b2ae-18b3
-nle2-a55c-3948fbe6a4b story.html.
278. Adam Entous, Special Report-How the White House Learned To Love the Drone, U.K.
REUTERS (May 19, 2010, 3:03 AM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2oio/o 5/19/uk-pakistan
-drones-idUKTRE64H5U7201oo519.
279. In May 2010, U.S. counterterrorism officials stated that since the summer of 2008, CIA
drones had killed approximatelY Soo foreign militants in Pakistan, of whom 14 were
considered top-tier militant targets, and another 25 mid- to high-level targets. Id. In August
2011, unidentified CIA agents admitted that since May 2010, drones had killed more than
600 militants. Scott Shane, C.I.A. Is Disputed on Civilian Toll in Drone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 11, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2oll/o8/12/world/asia/12drones.html.
z8o. Peter Bergen & Jennifer Rowland, Civilian Casualties Plummet in Drone Strikes,
CNN (July 14, 2012, 12:20 PM), http://www.cnn.comV2012/07/13/opinion/bergen-civilian
-casualties/index.html.
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arbitrarily fix the dividing line somewhere between no process and full due
process, and call the result a solution. I argue instead for a theoretically
coherent, centuries-old alternative: outlawry proceedings that compel the
prospective target to make the choice that will determine the content of his due
process rights. This response-contingent model of due process offers
government targets the protections to which every citizen is entitled in
peacetime, narrowed only as necessitated by the national security demands of
an unending war.
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